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ABSTRACT
This study examines the fundamental influence that culture has on the process and
products of defense analysis and strategic planning. It demonstrates that culture, as the
primary source of the policy-maker's epistemology, is an essential determinant of the
outputs of the strategic planning process. Culture has this effect because strategic planning
is nothing more than a collection of considered judgments, but judgments made through the
"perceptual lens" created by one's own culture. The study looks at the components of
culture: how and why it forms, is maintained, and changes in support of a specific group's
internal integration and external adaptation functions. Through this effort, culture is
exposed as a primary cause of individual and collective behavior. As such, it is presented
S\ as a principal source of data for understanding and explaining national behavior in the
international environment. Concurrently, the study shows that strategic planning, as a
fundamentally value-laden process, is highly susceptible to the negative effects of a
perspective biased by the planner's own acculturation. Therefore, the subjects of
ethnocentrism and cultural relativism are examined. This study also investigates the
concepts of "strategic culture" and "national style" in strategy. It shows that strategic
culture may be analyzed as the culture of a nation's "security community." National style,
in turn, is presented as an artifact of the strategic culture. Finally, a "strategic behavior
model" is presented ar.i' briefly tested to demonstrate the methodological linkage between
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis takes a rather untraditional approach to the study of defense analysis and
strategic planning, and it does so to serve both an informative and an explanatory task. The
informative task is to heighten the awareness of the analyst and planner to the subtle
influence that culture has on one's "perspective," and to suggest the effect this can have on
their strategic choices. The explanatory task is to show how this knowledge may be
expanded and further applied to the study of national security affairs.
In the most general terms, then, this study examines the process and products of
"acculturation" as the fundamental source of one's perspective. In this manne,, the thesis
attempts to show that an understanding of culture and its influence can be of paramount
importance to those whose task is evaluating and planning for national defense. This
thesis will also demonstrate that strategy itself is intrinsically dependent upon one's
perspective.
Concurrently, the study will expand the basic subject area to include a new and still
underdeveloped application of culture as a source of national behavior. This area of
research concentrates on a new analytical construct, "strategic culture," and its derivative
affect, "national style," in security behavior.
4. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The reason for this study is twofold: first, although the fundamental affect of culture
is well known, it does not appear that this knowledge is routinely presented to students or
practitioners as a source of concern in defense analysis or strategic planning.I This thesis
addresses this area in detail and shows how this deficiency can be a source of
"misjudgment" in strategy formation.
Secondly, although the subject area has traditionally been reserved for anthropologists,
it has begun to receive widespread (albeit hesitant) usage in the study of international
affairs. 2 More recently, it has piqued the interest of students of national security affairs as
well. Apparently, scholars have recognized the potential value of this topic area and are
willing to explore it in more depth. However, they are still in the earliest stages of applying
it to "national" behavior. Several foreign affairs specialists have investigated the affects of
culture on national behavior before, and although this area of study lost favor in the heyday
of the "behaviorists," it appears to be regaining respect in the field today. 3 As a result of
this renewed effort, a number of new methods to account for the "imponderable" effects of
a society's culture are available for use in this and other areas of study. As an application
of the new methodology, one group of defense analysts, for example, has begun to
IThe affects of culture on perspective have been of interest to social scientists for at least 90 years. For
example, the first reference to "ethnocentrism," which refers to a culture-specific perspective, appears in a
1906 text by William Sumner, Folkways, (Boston: Ginn Co., 1906), p. 13. Also, for recent applications
of the phenomenon for security students, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics. (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1976).
2See, for example, the arguments in favor of this transition by Hugh V. Emy, "From a Positive to a
Cultural Science: Toward a New Rationale for Political Studies," Political Studies. Vol. XXXVII. No. 2,
(1989), pp. 188-204.
31nternaional relations scholars are currently engaged in a "debate" of sorts that somewhat debunks the
"rational" and "empirical" models in use for the past twenty years. Critics of these models and methods
argue that, in neglecting the "imponderable" variables (such as culture), the methodology neglects a great
deal of valid data. See for example, the collection of articles recently published in International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 1989), especially Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the
Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," pp. 235-254; and Thomas J. Biersteker,
"Critical Reflections on Post-Postitivism in International Relations," pp. 263-267. Additionally, one
recent study of U.S. foreign policy emphasizes the influence of a unique "American" culture on U.S.
foreign policy. See Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign
Affairs, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983).
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investigate "culture" as a variable to explain the "security" behavior of states.4 This is the
central topic area of this thesis.
B. ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH
The study is divided into two parts: in Part I, the objective is to look closely at the
basic topic of acculturation. Chapter II examines what exactly this process is and how its
influence can be extrapolated theoretically for its effect in the "output" of defense analysis
and planning. The study shows that acculturation creates a culture-specific perspective and
forms of beha,,ior that adversely impact problem-solving and decision-making for defense.
This affect is illustrated by examining culture and the fundamentals of socialization and the
social-learning process. The study demonstrates that although culture and socialization
perform essential functions for society, they can have concurrent, yet negative, impact by
inhibiting effective cross-cultural interaction. The negative affects of culture are examined
in a general manner, and then applied specifically to the task facing the security analyst and
planner in Chapter III. This is accomplished by using several "strategic planning models"
that have received widespread and influential use, and yet, do not specifically account for
the influence of "cultural" variables.
Part II of the study concentrates on the expanded application of culture as a source of
national "style" in international behavior. This area of international studies has received
renewed attention and at least one new model has been proposed to account for
"cultural/societal" influence on national behavior. 5 This model will be reviewed and
4 By far the most extensive effort in this regard has been accomplished by Colin Gray in Nuclear Strategy
and National Style, (Lanham, MD: Hamihon Press. 1986). See also, Jack Snyder, Soviet Strategic
Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options, RAND Report R-2154-AF, (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, September, 1977).
5 The model used in this study is adapted from one presented as a "foreign policy behavior model" by Baard
B. Knudsen in 'The Paramount Value of Cultural Sources: Foreign Policy and Comparative Foreign
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proposed as one method to approach the concepts of "strategic culture" and "national style"
in strategy.
These two relatively new concepts have recently gained notoriety as yet another
methodological approach to the study of national security affairs6 . Proponents of these
two constructs hope to show that they may be used to explain some types of specific
security behavior in the international environment. Neither of these tools, however, either
the model or the concept of strategic culture, is fully developed, but they do have great
potential and therefore merit further study. This thesis hopes to contribute to this effort if
only to enlighten readers to what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.
Chapter IV examines the concept of "strategic culture" and its potential utility. Several
key works have recently addressed this concept and they are reviewed and critiqued as the
primary source of data on a new methodological approach to explaining national security
behavior. This study looks at the work accomplished to date in an effort to determine
commonality of usage and definition of the concept. The findings are presented and
applied, in Chapter V, to a proposed model of national security behavior.
Chapter V examines the derivative concept of "national style" in strategy. This concept
speaks to the proposed affect of a state-specific strategic culture, which, like culture itself,
is said to prescribe behavior among those who hold it in common. Because little work has
been accomplished in this area of security studies, it is difficult to ascertain the full potential
of this notion, but examples of the proposed affect on the strategic behavior of the United
Policy Research Reconsidered," Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics,
Vol. XXII. No. 2, (1987), pp. 81-113.
6 Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., and Snyder, Soviet Strategic Culture, op. cit.,
are the two most notable examples. See also Cames Lord, "American Strategic Culture," in Comparative
Strategy: An International Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, (1985), pp. 269-293. For a sharply critical appraisal
of the genre, see Scott Sagan's review of Robert Dalleck's American Style of Foreign Polic,', op. cit., in
Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, (July-August 1983), p. 192.
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States and the Soviet Union are presented as case studies illustrating the utility of these
concepts.
Finally, the findings and conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter VI, along
with specific recommendations for further effort in this area of security studies.
Hopefully, the reader will be satisfied at this point on the utility of both the fundamental
and expanded application of the notion that culture does , in fact, influence the behavior not
only of the individual, but of nations as well. Whether or not it can be used to predict
when and how nations will act in specific circumstances is yet to be proved, but this thesis
hopes to give "two cranks on the handle in the right direction." 7
7Rear Admiral Hill's words in Arms Control At Sea, (Annapolis,MD: United States Naval Institute Press,
1989), p. 213.
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II. CULTURE AND PERCEPTION
The study begins with an examination of the origin and implication of one's
perspective because this knowledge is of great value to the strategic planner and defense
analyst. Additionally, this portion of the study forms the foundation for the next
discussion on the advanced application of "cultural" analysis in defense studies. The
ultimate objective of this thesis is to examine the concepts of "strategic culture" and
"national style" in strategy, but that cannot be accomplished without a basic understanding
of the concept of culture itself. This chapter examines that area in some detail.
A. THE ORIGINS OF PERSPECTIVE
Anyone who has ever attempted to understand why humans act as they do has been
puzzled at one time or another by behavior that simply appeared irrational. However, upon
further evaluation, one may have concluded that, from the point of view of the subject, the
behavior was in fact highly rational after all. This is one admittedly simplistic example of
how perspective affects both behavior and analysis, and it serves as an appropriate point of
departure for further discussion.
In the example presented, the analyst was subject to the bias of his own
preconceptions of "rational" behavior, and inadvertently failed to account for the mitigating
affects of "cultural" information not at his immediate, empirical disposal. Of course, such a
crude example is easily criticized simply because it does not present all of the "facts"
surrounding the event; but it is only meant to illustrate that, in some cases, misjudgment is
simply due to an error of perspective. Consider the following observation by noted
anthropologist Adda Bozeman, who, when critiquing some aspects of U.S. foreign policy,
6
concluded that one of the major problems confronting the international policy-maker in the
United States is the "illusion of congruent values."
Mankind is not all of one kind; rather, it consists of a plurality of speech
communi'ies and civilizations. Each of these is sustained not so much by a particular
political or economic arrangement as by its own sub-structure of paramount values.
A culture's survival is a function of the basic ideas and persuasions that lend
uniqueness to the culture complex in the first p'ace and they are not comprised in
times of internal or external stress.8
Bozems-n points to a major source of confusion and misunderstanding in international
relations which can have important consequences for the strategist. She succinctly
illustrates how different societies have different kalue systems, thus setting the stage for
major problems of cross-cultural interaction and analysis. But what is the source of these
different "values?" The answer, of course, io culture itself. In fact, one of the most basic
definitions of culture is the "values" of the group it serves.9 However, this is far too
simple an explanation for what is truly a complex problem for the security planner.
Ther, fore, a closer look at culture itself is worth the effort at this point in the study.
B. CULTURE AND SOCIAL VALUES
Or. a macro-scale, culture is one of the m.)st significant determinants of boundary in
the mass of humanity.10 There are many others, of course, including race and language,
but culture Is one of the most fundamental. Territorial lines may bound a nation-state, but
culture is a real differt.ntiating element between peoples of the world. A disc( irse on the
8Adda Bozeman. "American Policy and the Illusion of Congruent Values," Strategic Review. Vol. XV.
No. 1. (Winter 0987), pp. 11-23.
9 Cuhture is the "sum of morally forceful understandings acquired by learning and shired %ith members of
the group to which thz learner belcngs." M. 1 Schwartz and D. K. Jordan, Culture: The Anthropological
Perspective, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), p. 52.
10 Edward T. Hall Beyond Culture, (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. 1977), p. 16.
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international ramifications of this fact is unnecessary, but it leads one into a discussion of
why culture exists in the first place: to bound and define unique groups of individuals who
have come together for a collective purpose.
Culture has been described in terms of the artifacts of societies: Their art, language,
and other products of human activity. I1 This is no longer entirely true; modem
anthropologists now view culture not so much as what humans do as what they learn. For
example, one recent textbook addresses culture in this way:
We will use "culture" to refer to the system of shared ideas, to the conceptual
designs, the shared system of meanings, that underlie the ways people live. Culture.
so defined, refers to what humans learn, not what they do or make. (emphasis
original). 12
This passage reflects a significant distinction between modem and classical
anthropology that is important to the subject of this thesis. The distinction between the
study of culture as the study of artifacts or the study of social learning is what leads to a
greater utility of the concept itself: it effectively opens the field to other scholars who now
recognize the subject of culture as being applicable to their own social science disciplines.
Nevertheless, the basic study of culture remains the stock and trade of the anthropologist,
although this too, may be changing.
Anthropologists, like their counterparts in other disciplines, have different "schools"
of thought on just exactly what culture is or what it does for humanity, but they all seem to
1 lFor example, see the "classical" definition by Tyler (1871), quoted in L. A. White, The Science of
Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1969), p. 87.
12Roger M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), p. 87.
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agree that culture is the intellectual underpinning of normal human behavior in groups. 13
In fact, culture can be said to only exist for relatively well-defined and stable groups.'
4
There is no such thing as the "culture of the one," because, what culture fundamentally
represents is the "rules" that tell individuals how to behave in the presence of others.
Culture basically serves as a definition of the "norms" of human behavior, and by this
definition, is recognizably unique to those it serves. 15
Viewed in this manner, the concept of culture has applications at various levels of
humanity, from small groups through nations. One could, using this criteria, even argue
that all of humanity belongs to one culture. Although this may be so, it is not useful for the
purposes here to belabor the issue further. What is important, however, is that culture does
define groups. It does so by binding together several vital functions, necessary for the
group's survival, into a framework which members of the group can learn. 1 6 In this
regard, culture has both intra- and inter-group functions that, although necessary, can
become a hindrance. At this juncture, and before proceeding to the details of the functions
of culture, it seems appropriate to look closely at a dei lition of culture itself so one may
see culture clearly as a phenomenon itself.
13 A useful summation of the varying schools of culture is provided by Roger M. Keesing. in "Theories of
Culture." in Bernard 1. Siegel. Alan R. Beals. and Stephen Tyler. eds.. Annual Review of Anthropology.
1974, Vol. 3, (Palo Alto,CA: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1974), pp. 73-97.
14Goodenough asserts that "Cultural theory must explain in what sense we can speak of culture as being
shared or as the property of groups." W. H. Goodenough, Culture, Language and Society,
(ReadingMA:Addison-Wesley, 1971), p. 20, quoted in Keesing. "Theories of Culture," Seigel, et. al.,
Annual Review of Anthropology, op. cit., p. 84.
15Clyde Kluckhorn. "Universal Categories of Culture," in Frank W. Moore. eds.. Reading In Cross.
Cultural Methodology, (New Haven: HRAC Press, 1961), pp. 89-107.
16See for example, Keesing's discussion of "Cultures as Adaptive Systems," in "heories of Culture."
Siegel, et. al., Annual Review of Anthropology, op. cit., p. 74.
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C. CULTURE DEFINED
During the course of the research for this study a number of definitions of culture were
found. It is unnecessary to list them all, but suffice it to say that there were almost as many
as there were studies that used culture as the prime topic of inquiry. In fact, one author,
reporting on research of a similar application of this topic, lamented: "definitions of culture
abound!"' 17 He was certainly correct.
Most definitions have common themes, although they can be divided into "modem"
and "classical" schools. The former tend to include mostly artifactual elements, and the
latter seem to concentrate at the more fundamental level of normative values. The definition
of culture used in this study represents the "modem" philosophy. To illustrate the diversity
of definitions, the following common "normative" meanings are provided; they represent
the full spectrum of modem definitions and impressions of culture. The concept is said to
embody:
1. Observed behavioral regularities of individuals in a group.
2. The norms that evolve to guide behavior in a group.
3. The dominant values espoused by the group.
4. The philosophy that guides a group's behavior.
5. The rules of the game for surviving in the group.
6. The group hLerarchy of values.
7. The feeling, or climate, that exists in a group.
8. The beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of thought employed by group members. 18
17Knudsen. "The Paramount Value of Cultural Sources," in Cooperation and Conflict, op. Cit., p. 107.
18Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View, (San Francisco: Jossey-




The same author who compiled a majority of the above listing recognized that these
examples do not capture the essence of culture. He argued persuasively that they are
merely reflections of culture, and not culture itself. The author, Edgar Schein, provides the
definition of culture that is used in this study. His was selected because, of all of the many
considered, it is the most elegant and seems to capture the totality of the concept itself. 19
Schein defines culture as:
a basic pattern of assumptions-- invented, discovered, or developed by a given
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration-- that have worked well enough in the past to be considered valid and,
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel
in relation to those problems.20
Culture, thus defined, "can be applied to any size social unit that has had the
opportunity to learn and stabilize its view of itself and the environment around it."
2 1 Its
influence exists at various levels of awareness to those it serves. Schein's definition
illuminates the fact that culture is not merely the "values," or "beliefs," or "attitudes" that
influence behavior: rather, it is the collection of "assumptions" that underpin the value-
system itself.22 These assumptions have been internalized by the members of the group
19Schein's derinition captures the "totality" of culture because his definition includes elements of the three
principal "schools" of cultural theory: in this definition, culture is (I) an adaptive system that helps
humans adjust to the environment: (2) and ideational, or cognitive, system that drives epistemology; and (3)
it is a socio.cultural system that drives "the patterns of life of communitics." See Keesing's 'Theories of
Culture," in Seigel, et. al., eds., Annual Review of Anthropology, op. cit.
20Schein, Organizational Culture, ibid. p. 9.
2 1Ibid, p. 8.
22
"For culture consists not of actions, but of acquired tendencies to react, habits of mind and feeling,
assumptions which proceed belief and emotions which lie behind motions." (emphasis added)J. Martin,
"American Culture: The Intersection of Past and Future," in J. G. Kirk, America Now, (New York:
Athenum Press, 1968), p. 187, quoted in Knudsen, "The Paramount Importance of Cultural Sources,"
Cooperation and Conflict, op. cit., p. 90.
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and they are, as Schein argues, "taken for granted," "invisible," and exist in the
"preconscious." Figure II-1 illustrates this relationship.2 3
Levels of Culture and Their Interaction
Artifacts and Creations
Technology Visible but often not
Art decipherable
Visible and audible behavior patterns
Values
Testable in the physical environment Greater level of awareness
Testable in the social environment
Basic Assumptions
Relationship to environment Taken for granted
Nature of reality, time and space Invisible
Nature of human nature Preconscious
Nature of human activity
Nature of human relationships
Figure 11-1
When conceived of in this manner, one may see that culture itself, as a phenomenon
representing a set of the most basic assumptions that individuals hold about themselves and
the world around them, is, in fact, a prescription for the artifactual reflections of culture
traditionally viewed as culture itself. As Schein notes, the definition of culture used herein,
does not reflect any "overt behavior pattern" because:
2 3 Schein, Organizational Culture, op. cit., p. 14.
12
overt behavior is always determined by both the cultural predispositions (the
assumptions, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings that are patterned) and by the
situational contingencies that arise from the external environment. Behavioral
regularities could thus be as much a reflection of the environment as of the culture,
and should, therefore, not be a prime basis for defining the culture. (emphasis
original). 2 4
In this statement, Schein implies that, while culture may guide behavior, it will not
always explain it: "situational contingencies" may dominate causality, but culture will
always dominate perception. This notion is critically important to the purpose of this thesis
because it brings into sharp relief the most basic influence of culture and the justification for
increased awareness of this affect. Strategic analysis, and decision-making for defense, is
nothing more than a collection of judgements made about how to provide security for a
nation. And, as one can see, culture significantly influences judgement:
Judgements are based upon experience, and experience is interpreted by each
individual in terms of his own enculturation. Those who hold for the existence of
fixed values will find materials in other societies that necessitate re-evaluation of their
assumptions.2 5
With culture's influence on basic perception thus exposed, the effort now turns to
examining why it exists, and to look closely at how, in satisfying its purpose, culture
performs both positive and negative functions for the group it serves.
241bid, p. 9.
25Melville I. Herskovits. Cultural Relativism: Perspective in Cultural Pluralism, (New York: Random
House, 1972), p. 15.
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D. CULTURE AND GROUP MAINTENANCE
Culture is a concept that is often used incorrectly to describe group maintenance
functions when, in fact, it actually supports these sustenance functions. This section
examines this common error and illustrates more closely the concept of culture itself. The
"maintenance" functions addressed here are not performed by culture, but are rather the
source and a reflection of culture.2 6
Culture can be said to exist only to serve a relatively well-dcfined group, and it does so
by providing the intellectual assumptions that underpin judgement and behavior within the
group. 2 7 Culture performs these functions as the group forms, becomes further defined,
and as its members learn to deal collectively with their environment.
Culture supports group dynamics by providing guidelines for ,he "oven behavior" of
both individuals and the group itself. But what behavior does culture specifically
condition? and, why does it necessarily have this affect? A number of maintenance
functions are necessary for group survival and are influenced by culture, but it is beyond
the scope of this study to review them all in detail. Nevertheless, a brief review is
beneficial because the typological examples presented are used for further development of
the case that culture influences human behavior, and ab extensio, strategic planning and
analysis.
26Schein describes these functions in great detail in 'The Functions of Culture in Organizations,"
Organizational Culture, op. cit., pp. 49-84.
27
"well-defined" does not mean that groups should be viewed as boundary-static; groups expand and
contract in size as they absorb and are absorbed by other other groups. See, for example, Snyder's
discussion of "sub-groups" within the Soviet "strategic culture" in Snyder. Soviet Stratgic Culture, op.
cit., pp. 10-13: see also. Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," in
International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, (Fall 1981), pp. 4243.
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The following two sections address the issue of culture and its purpose in support of
group maintenance. Before proceeding, however, a few important remarks are in order:
first, culture not only helps groups form and survive, it becomes synonymous with the
particular group it serves; secondly, this portion of the study concentrates on how groups
form, but one will note that in the process, culture itself forms; thirdly, this section is
based upon an "organizational" appoach to culture.28 The organizational approach is not
significantly different in effect than the more traditional , or societal, approach taken by the
anthropologist. It is, however, less complex, but very useful to the purpose of this study.
In a theoretical sense, then, the organizational approach to culture may be seen as applicable
to "groups" or "organizations" of all sizes: the culture of a tribe, an organization, or a
nation may be described in this manner.
1. Culture's Maintenance Functions
Culture supports two types of group maintenance functions: one internal and the
other external. Although functionally separate, they ate highly interdependent, and have a
mutually reinforcing affect on each other. Most important, they contribute to the overall
mission of the group's survival. Culture only exists to serve groups, and as groups form,
the culture develops. Why groups form is a topic unto itself, but culture ultimately comes
to reflect the group's reason for being in the first place: the group's "mission" is, so to
speak, one artifactual paradigm of the culture.
28This methodology derives primarily from Schein's effort in Organizational Culture, op. cit. However,
Graham A!Jison's work on the "conceptual models" of U.S. foreign and military policies appears to support
use of this framework. His "Organizational Process Model" has some of the characteristics of Schein's
approach and seems to acknowledge the "cultural" impact of group behavior. See Graham T. Allison, 'The
Cuban Missile Crisis: A Case Study of Crisis Decision-.making," in John F. Reichan and Steven R.
Strum, eds., American Defense Policy, (Baltimorc: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982),
especially pp. 583.601.
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When groups form, no matter the reason, they do so of choice and with a purpose
in mind.29 Once formed, they must maintain and survive to support the original purpose
or mission. To survive, the group must (1) bring in and indoctrinate new members, and
(2) remain defined and cohesive. At the same time, the group must learn to deal with
stimulants in the external environment that (1) may impede the mission of the group, or (2)
threaten the group itself.
a. Internal Maintenance
Survival of the group is one "internal integration function" that culture
serves. Group cohesion is another. To survive as a group, the membership must solve a
number of issues that relate to the group's internal organization and operation. The
following list of internal "problems" is representative. One may say that, as a minimum, a
group's needs involve:
1. A common language and "conceptual categories."
2. "Boundaries," and rules for inclusion/exclusion.
3. A system that prescribes "peer relationships."
4. A means of meeting out reward and punishment.
5. An ideology, or "religion," to guide the group. 30
Resolution of these and a number of other similar issues allow the group to
survive, maintain, and grow. However, one can see that the solutions are fundamentally
290ne could certainly argue that all groups do not "form of choice." Shi"es, convicts in a prison, or others
forced together under similar circumstances and against their will certainly fit into this category.
Nevertheless, they will, of choice and necessity once together, form a group, and come to develop a group-
specific culture according to the model presented herein.
30Adapted from Schein's examples of "internal maintenance functions," in Organizational Culture, op.
cit., pp. 65-82. See also Morton Halperin's discussion of the "shared images" and bureaucratic politics in,
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974). pp. 150
ff; and Allison, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in Reichart, et. aL., American Foreign Policy, op. cit.
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subjective: they are "right" and "correct" to the group they serve. It does not matter
whether the solutions are forced upon the group (by a dictator, "boss," or tribal chief) or
whether they are a.-rived at by mutual consent. The arbiter is irrelevant; the motivation is
not.
Ultimately, such solutions become the property of the group. They may, in
time, achieve status as culture, or "cultural artifacts" of the group. They may even become
"assumptions," and form the fundamental linkage between culture and behavior. This
linkage is further strengthened when one recalls the hierarchy of culture: "assumptions"
underpin "values," which in turn prescribe "artifacts," or the products of "overt
behavior." 3 1 Therefore, as solutions to internal integration problems become assumptions,
and exist primarily at the level of the preconscious, they begin to affect how people think,
solve problems, and act.
b. External Maintenance
Culture would not be nearly as interesting or important a topic for study if all
group values systems were the same or even very similar. They are not, and this fact is of
paramount importance to the purpose of this study. As an example, many group missions
are in conflict with each other, and inter-group competition and rivalry is almost always
unavoidable in an anarchistic external environment. The implications for "order" between
groups hardly needs illustration or deliberation. 32 Nonetheless, each group's unique
culture helps it to maintain itself in this hostile external environment.
3 1Schein's description of"The Levels and Con tent of Culture and Their Interaction," in Ibid,. ss.e
especially Figure 1, p. 14, and accompanying text, pp. 14.21.
32The example of "colliding survival missions" of nations in the international community may be tested
in the very near future as such truly "universal" concerns as the global environment come more to the
forefront of concern. This example may be one of the first "adaptation issues" that confronts the "group" of
humanity.
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Groups form for a purpose, and once they are constituted and organized
internally, then they must be equipped to accomplish whatever it was that caused them to
form initially. For the purpose of this study it matters little why groups form. Likewise,
how it chooses to defirie its mission is unimportant. One should recognize that, depending
upon how the group is organized internally, the "core mission," or "primary task" may be
determined by direction or consensus. The group only need know what it is to accomplish
and how it is expected to accomplish it.
One way of looking at group survival in the external environment is in terms
familiar to the defense analyst: survival becomes a matter of strategy. As a minimum, a
group needs to resolve the following issues if it is to survive in an environment that is
beyond the complete control of its members. The group requires:
1. A stated mission.
2. A strategy to achieve the mission.
3. Goals to judge progress.
4. A system to judge accomplishment of the goals.
5. A feed-back mechanism.
6. A correction plan to adjust progress. 33
The issue of survival in the external environment then becomes a function of
the group's "strategy," which, one can easily see, is fundamentally a function of
"judgement." Problem definition and analysis (the environment), solutions to the
problem(s) (the goals and strategy), and a scheme to adjust the two as a result of changes in
33Adapted from Schien's "external adaptation issues," in Organizational Culture. op. cit.. pp. 52-64; see
also Albert Clarkson, Toward Effective Strategic Analysis: New Applications of Information
Technology, (Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1981), especially Chapter 2. "Strategic Analysis Model," pp.
7-21; Clarkson's "model," although not designed as a "organizational-survival" model, speaks to the
process of strategic planning for nations as Schein does for organizations. Both view the "process" in much
the same way.
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either (a feed-back and correction scheme) are all subject to the perspective of the particular
group who conceptualizes them. Again, it does not matter who makes the decisions about
how to cope with the external problems; it simply matters that the decisions are made for
the group. They become group property, and ultimately, a part of the group's culture.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter addressed several key issues that are essential to further development of
the theme that culture affects how nations act, and to build the case that this notion may be
approached methodically and used predictively. In this regard, it may be useful here to re-
focus on the intended points of the chapter so as to ensure the proper groundwork for
succeeding chapters.
First, culture is the product of a group, no matter the size or purpose of the group.
Functionally, culture serves to help the group form, maintain itself, and survive in the
environment. An individual, as a member of the group, learns the rules associated with the
group, and the sub-groups (if any) to which he belongs. He is taught how to approach
problems and how to behave, and this socialization process has the added effect of teaching
the individual how to think. Culture, in fact, prescribes his cognitive and perceptual
framework.
Next, a group becomes defined by its culture, and, this may be seen as cumulative for
parent and sub-groups. It is important, for example, to view societies (and nations as
physically bounded societies) as one large group consisting of many sub-groups. The
concept of culture applies, at the macro-level, to the society as a whole, and, at the micro-
level, to tne sub-groups within the society. But, conceptually, the two must have a
commonality of basic assumptions. A sub-group, for example, cannot build its value
system in a vacuum; it must share assumptions with the host society's culture.
19
IMl. CULTURE AND STRATEGY
A case has been made for the linkage between culture and perception. The logic is
relatively simple and the implications for basic problem-solving and decision-making
inspire little argument. In general, culture's affect is positive: it provides individuals with
the guidelines necessary to function in the social environment. It also serves the larger
purpose of helping the group that the individual belongs to survive. Culture has a cohesive
affect for the group: it binds and it defines.
Concurrently, culture can have a negative impact for the group when it is forced to
interact with other "foreign" groups; this is especially evident if the basic value-systems
and missions of the groups collide. When this occurs, the group is confronted with a basic
survival issue: its prosperity or defense becomes an issue. One way of approaching group
survival in the external environment was presented briefly in the previous chapter: the
group needs a strategy for its survival and prosperity.
A group (or society), if organized for a specific mission, will approach external
survival at least conceptually in this manner. Of course, all groups may not consciously
view the problem in quite the same "structured" format as presented herein, but they
logically should see the problems of survival and prosperity in terms of "missions,"
"goals," and "plans of action." If not, one could easily argue that it is a result of the
group's underdeveloped culture in the first place.
Strategic planning, and culture's affect on that process, is the central topic of this
chapter. The following sections examine several methodological approaches to the
discipline of strategy and provide models to illustrate the process. At the same time, the
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negative affects of the strategist's own perception of the problem itself, and how he arrives
at his solutions, are fuirther illuniir.ated.
This chapter seeks two objectives: first, it seeks to bridge the two major themes of this
study through an examination of the topic of strategy itself. Chapter II illuminat, "the basic
influence of culture -- perception, and this chapter looks closely at how this can be
usefully applied to the process of strategic analysis and planning. Second, the chapter lays
the foundation for succeeding chapters that seek to examine the concepts of strategic culture
and national style in strategy. To support this effort, this chapter looks specifically at the
outputs of strategic planning processes. This serves to illustrate how the ideas of strategic
culture and national style may be applied and tested in subsequent chapters.
The first part of the chapter examines strategy in general, b,'t .,,e effort is not
exhaustive. 3 4 It is not an in-depth iavestigation of the subject, but rather, an undertaking
to provide a basic conceptual model which can be used to illustrate the potential impact of
culture on the "process" of strategic planning.
A. STRATEGY AS A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS
Strategy has been described in the previous chapter as a problem of group "external
adaptation" to the environment. As such, strategic planning represents one of the most
fundamental problem-solving issues confronting a group, no matter the size of the group or
its mission. This section takes the approach that strategy, as a basic problem-solving issue,
confronts all relatively well-defined and internally structured groups that have a reason for
being and surviving as a separate entity in the external environment. When viewed as
34This section deals very little with the large body of literature on "traditional" military strategy. Thba
subject is addressed in somewhat more detwil in the following chaptcr; what is addressed here may be cal.',X
the "strategy for programming," or "developmental" strategy.
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such, strategy becomes a process, a way to a solution of a problem. The problem, as
defined in this section, is the group's survival.
However, having said this, one can easily recognize that the intent of a specific
strategy is a function of the "primary task" or mission that caused the group's formation.
Survival is fundamental to all groups, but it is important to appreciate that just how
"survival" is defined determines the intent of a particular strategy. Because of this, the term
"strategy" means many things to different people, depending upon the group they associate
the word with. Strategy has long been affiliated with the military plans of nations, but
recently, the termi has been used to describe a process appropriate to any number of
applications. One frequently sees a variety of modifiers associated with the term:
"political," "economic," and "marketing" strategies are examples of these applications.
Author J. C. Wylie, when writing on military strategy, noted that "strategy is a loose son
of word," and unless specifically associated with a "goal," its meaning is highly
ambiguous. 35 Wylie is correct, but for the purposes here, the goals of a particular strategy
is irrelevant. The following sections addc-ess "generic" strategy as an example of a process.
1. Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means
In the most basic terms, strategy may be viewed as a problem-sol . ing process
which is intrinsically linked to how the group perceives and defines itself and the
environment. The group needs to know where it is going---the ends, how it plans to get
there--- the ways, and what is necessary in terms of "instruments," or "tools," to support
the plan--- the means. 36 This most simple approach to strategy illustrates the fundamental
35j. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, Classics of Sea Power Series
Re-print, (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Insticute Press, 19890, p. 14.
36This "model" was taken from Arthur F. Lykkes, Jr., "Defining Military Strategy," Military Review,
Vol. LXIX, No. 5, (May 1989), p. 2: Wy,,.'s "equation" is similar in Ibid.
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issues that must be resolved by the group in order to ensure its survival or prosperity in the
environment. However, there are deficiencies in this conceptual approach because it fails
to give the necessary emphasis to two primary considerations for survival or prosperity: it
does not differentiate "opportunities" or "threats" in the environment. These two elements
are inherently included in the equation, yes, but they are not defined as separate elements.
2. Strategy and the External Environment
Strategy approached as a "ways and means" issue is conceptually incomplete for
the purposes here. It concentrates on the essential elements, but this approach fails to give
proper emphasis to the countervailing consequences of the environment. Of course, this
deficiency can be discounted by the argument that the environment served as the motive
force for strategy in the first place, and this is correct. However, strategy as presented
herein, is a problem-solving process, and any conceptual design that more completely
outlines the elements of the "problem" is more efficient and will obviously give one better
products.
The requirement for a strategy, like culture, is a function of the environment.37
The group, by definition, has a mission, a reason for being. As such, there is a goal:
something that the groups collectively desires. This may be (as in the case of a nation)
repelling hostile groups, it may be (as in the case of a business) obtaining a larger portion
of the "market share," or it may be simply concluding a successful campaign for political
office (as in the case of a political candidate or his party). But, in every case, the fact that
others in the environment, other nations, other businesses or political opponents, seek
37According to Schein: "One must never forget that the environment initially determines the possibilities,
options, and constraints for a group, and thus forces the group to specify its primary task or function if it is
to survive at all. The environment thus initially influences the formation of culture, but once the culture is
present in the sense of shared assumptions, those assumptions, in turn, influence what will be perceived and
defined as the environment." Organizational Culture, op. cit., p. 51.
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similar goals causes one to view the environment as an "impediment." Strategy exists as a
function of the competitive social environment, and without competition, there would be
no need for strategy: the group would only need determine what it desires, and take it.
Because the environment is an impediment, it is something that requires careful
and structured analysis. What in the environment specifically hinders acquisition of the
group's goals? Who are the competitors and what are their capabilities? Are there
sympathetic elements o; allies in the environment to assist the group in its endeavor? The
list is endless, but depending upon the group and its goals and mission, this list may be
tailored to the particular needs of a unique group. The essential point to realize is that the
group must view the environment as an element intrinsically linked to its approach to the
process of strategic planning.
3. Basic Strategic Planning Models
One useful methodology to apply to the basic strategic planning process has been
provided by authors William Ascher and William Overholt. 38 Their "strategic planning
model" broadly illustrates the process: to achieve the "mission" (regardless of what that
mission might be), the group defines the goals, or "interest," that it seeks to fulfill. They
analyze the environment, and devise a strategy that will succeed in the forecast environment
while concurrently achieving the desired goals. See Figure I1-i1.39
38William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting, (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1983), pp. 21-40.
39AII figures this section are adapted from Ascher & Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting.
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Basic Strategic Planning Model
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Figure I1l-1
However, although the process appears simple, the authors recognize the
uncertainties inherent in forecasting the future. Therefore, they recommend projecting
several different, yet separate, potential future environments. Using this methodology, a
unique strategy could then be formulated to achieve specific goals in each of the separate
environments. See Figure 111-2.
Figure 111-2
This may well be an effective method to solve for incertitude in the future, but it is
not the most efficient. For example, having, say, three separate environments would
necessitate three coincidental strategies. However, the "tools" to operationalize one
strategy in a specific environment may be inefficient or ineffective for another. Thus , the
tools to achieve strategy #1 in environment #1 may not be suitable or as efficient if events
force their use in environment #2. The authors of this model recognize also that if the
projected environment(s) fail to evolve as forecast, then a strategy selected for that
environment may be inappropriate when put to the test of unforeseen circumstances. The
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task of revising a strategy "on the fly" may be too difficult, or even impos,,ible, thereby
necessitating a "crisis" response.
The proposed solution to these problems is elegant in its simplicity. Ascher and
Overholt recommend determining a variety of future environments and then aggregating the
results into a common "core" environment. This core environment represents similar
elements of a variety of possible futures that have the highest probability of occurring as
forecast. Other less assured elements forming dissimilar yet potential contingencies are so
differentiated. Of these, the strategist selects a "preferred" environment and tailors the
planning effort toward this contingency. See Figure II1-3.






This "complex" planning model allows the group to tailor its strategies to a wide
variety of possible contingencies and environments. A "core" strategy, operable in the core
environment, forms the basis of the groups planning efforts. The "preferred" environment
then informs a "basic" strategy." A "hedging strategy" is designed to account for
"exogenous contingencies" that, although unlikely to occur, do have potential to evolve.
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The Ascher/Overholt model is a "developmental" model of strategic planning. It is
optimized for long-range planning and provides a very efficient method of planning for
future environments.4 0 The model works best in the planning environment where the
strategist is unconstrained by either prescribed, or "by direction" goals, or limited to using
"in-hand" tools. The planner therefore is able to determine both the goals he seeks to
achieve and the strategy necessary to accomplish the goals. This model assumes that goals
and interests are determined as an integral part of the planning process, and that the tools
necessary to implement the strategy will be forthcoming following selection of the
appropriate "plan."
In this regard, the Ascher/Overholt model is quite different from "operational
planning" models which, like the major portion of military strategy, may depend upon
either existing tools or directed goals. This does not mean that the Ascher/Overholt model
will not work for operational strategy, for certainly it will. It is just not optimized for this
type of effort. This "complex" model is best applied to "grand" or "national strategy," but
it may be used here to show the influence that perspective has on the generic process of
strategic planning itself.4 1
Military strategy is no different, in theory, from the type of strategic planning
effort described by the "complex" model presented above. In reality, however, the "two
levels" of military strategy--- long-range or "developmental" and short-range or
40This description of strategic planning models has been associated with military strategy by Arthur F.
Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and
Application, Arthur F. Lykkes, Jr., eds., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. S. Army War College, 1989). p. 4.
4 1 See use of the Ascher/Overholt model in Paul Bracken, "Strategic Planning for National Security:
Lessons from the Business Experience," A RAND NOTE, (Santa Monica.CA: The RAND Corporation,
February 1990).
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"operational"--- are brought into sharp relief in national military planning.42 Some have
even gone so far as to divide military strategy into two types: "wartime" and "peacetime"
planning. The former, of course, is short range and represents what one traditionally
recognizes as specific war plans; the latter, however, cannot be so easily described except
to say that it is long-range. One author concluded that such peacetime planning is really
nothing more than basically "a choice among weapons systems."'4 3 This may be true, and
the implications of this statement deserve and will receive more treatment in the following
chapter. But at this point it is only necessary to recognize that the "complex" model used in
this section is meant to serve as a vehicle to explore the implications of perspective on the
problem-solving process of strategic planning.
C. CULTURAL VALUES AND STRATEGY
The complex strategic planning model used in the previous section describes one
efficient method of resolving the task of strategy formulation for group survival and
prosperity in the external environment. The process is conceptually simple: define the
goals that support interests, evaluate the environment, and devise a strategy. However,
each task is subjective and susceptible to the cultural bias of the group's basic assumptions
and value-system. Consider, for example, the task of determining "interests," which in
turn prescribes the "goals." By definition, interests are a function of what is important to
the gioup in terms not only of its basic mission, but also what is "valued" by the group's
basic assumptions. In the most fundamental sense, then, interests are a product of cultural
determinants. Likewise, the planning model demonstrates that the group must analyze the
environment and determine threats, opportunities, allies, adversaries, and the like. One
4 2 Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in Military Strategy, op. CiL. p. 4.
4 3Berrard Brodie. Strategy in the Missile Age, (Pnncewon:The Princeton University Press. 1965), p. 361.
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can easily see how each of these decisions can be influenced by both the culture of the
group itself and by how the group has defined its interests.
Even after the group's analysts have concluded the forecast of potential future
environments, one environment must be selected as the "preferred" alternative. This too, is
by definition, a subjective call on the part of the group concerned. In the final analysis,
strategy is a quintesientially subjective endeavor that is highly dependent upon what is
valued by the group it serves.
However, one should recall that a strategy is an artifact of the group's culture; it is
created. As such, it may be classified as an "oven behavior" patterned by the group's
assumptions. Schein cautioned that causality of overt behavior is a function both of the
prescription of the group's culture and the "situational contingencies" in the environment
that can influence behavior.44 In this regard, one cannot dispute the fact that strategy is
operationalized in an environment that is in flux; the environment is understandably
dynamic, and one of the most important "situational contingencies" of the environment may
be nothing more than the countervailing strategy of an opponent. This "action-reaction"
phenomenon presents :he strategist with a dilemma: he is presented with a requirement not
only to devise his own plans and strategy, but he must also be able to appreciate how the
adversary perceives the problem for his group. To accomplish this, the strategist, in his
role as an analyst. must be able to empathize with his adversary: he must be capable of
seeing the strategic planning process from another's point of view. The question is, how
can this be accomplished if judgement is predisposed by cultural bias?
4Schcin, Organizational Culture. op. cit., p. 9.
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1. Ethnocentrism
The condition of being unable to empathize with another is the result of one's
culture. As demonstrated herein, culture calibrates one's perspective during the
socialization process. As the individual "learns" how to act and think as a member of the
group, he internalizes the basic assumptions of the group which, in turn, become the basis
for both his and the group's value-system. The consequence that this has for one's
perceptual judgement is termed "ethnocentrism." It is the "perceptual lens" through which
one views the world.45 One author describes this condition as "the point of view that
one's own way of life is preferred to all others." 46 Another's description points more to
the impact that "ethnocentrism" has for the strategist. It inhibits objective judgement:
Ethnocentrism is the view of things in which one's own group is at the center of
everything, and all others are scaled and referenced to it. (emphasis added).4 7
One can see that ethnocentrism can make evaluation of the activities of other
groups difficult. Such judgements are likely to be colored by the preconceived conclusions
driven by the observer's cultural assumptions. The result is often a misleading evaluation,
a distorted picture of what the other group may actually be doing, and is caused by the
"projection of one's own frame of reference onto others." 48 This perceptual deficiency is
also described as "mirror-imaging" the values of one's own culture onto another. This, in
turn, severely hampers the analysts' ability to make unbiased judgements about those not in
his group. According to Bonfrenbrenner,
4 5Snyder, Soviet Strategic Culture, op. cit., p, v.
4 6Herskoviu, Cultural Relativism. op. cit., p. 21.
4 7Sumner, Folkways, op. cit., p. 13.
4 8Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, (New York: Holmes & Meier, Inc., 1979), p. 15.
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Mirror-imaging is a tendency to assimilate new perceptions into old and
unconsciously distort what one sees in such a way as to minimize a clash with
previous expectations. 4 9
The term ethnocentrism, then, describes the most basic influence that one's culture
and value-system has on the individual's ability to make objective judgements in cross-
cultural analysis. It is a universal socio-psychological phenomenon, and the impact on
strategic analysis and planning should be obvious. The defense policy of any state is, for
example, closely tied to that state's understanding of the international environment and its
place in that environment. To conduct effective and efficient planning to achieve its goals,
the group's analysts and planners must be able to account for the influence of their own
ethnocentrically biased judgement. A,,d, as one author concluded, "strategy is a
particularly ethnocentric business." 50
Some argue that it is impossible to entirely negate the effect of one's culture on
analysis and judgement, and this is probably true to a certain degree.5 1 For example, one
can argue that it is only possible to make judgements based upon one's own "frame of
reference." And, as a result, one could persuasively argue that it is impossible to truly see
the world through the eyes of one from another culture. If so, what is the solution for
those who must engage in cross-cultural analysis?
49Urie ltonfrenbrenner. "The Mirror-Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's
Report,' Journal Of Social Issues, Vol. 17, (1961), pp. 45-56.
50 Booth. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. op. CiL. p. 20.
5 1Herskovits, in Cultural Relativism, argued: 'There is literally no moment in the life of an individual
when the influence of culture is not felt," p. 76: see also: Donald T. Campbell, "Introduction: Herskovitz,




Recognition of ethnocentrism as a cultural phenomenon is certainly not new.
Anthropologists have wrestled with the implications of a culture-specific perspective for
their own objective analysis for many years.5 2 A number of methodologies have been
developed to help the anthropologist account for this problem, and the results of this effort
may be useful to the strategist.53
The issue, of course, is how to conduct effective cross-cultural analysis when the
cognitive facilities of the observer are biased by his own experience, culture, and point of
view. As described, the problem would appear insurmountable. In fact, it can be argued
that how one approaches the problem of analysis itself is a function of culture, and, as a
result, the conclusions drawn are always suspect.54 However, even though there would
appear to be no infallible solution, an effort must be made to counter cultural prejudice in
judgement. The question is how, in the absence of an absolute or universal "frame of
reference," can such a perspective be achieved? Is there an "opposite tendency" to
ethnocentrism? 55
The optimistic answer is in the affirmative: strive for an "objective" perspective
by becoming a cultural "relativist." To accomplish this, one must search for the source of
52Frank W. Moores. eds.. Readings In Cross.Cultural Methodology, op. cit., passimn.
53See especially the approach outlined in Oscar Lewis, "Comparisons in Cultural Anthropology," in Ibid,
p. 50-57.
54 This argument is based upon (I) Schein's assertion that a strategy for external adaptation is an artifact of
culture, and (2) Herskovits assertion on the permanency of ethnocentrism. Strategy, as a process that
requires analysis, cannot be free of cultural bias in the first place. This affect can only be mitigated by
effort.
55Booth's description of "cultural relativism" as "the opposite tendency of ethnocentrism," in Strategic
and Ethnocentrism, op. cit., p. 15.
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bias in one's own and other's frames of reference. The analyst must build toward the
ability to empathize with other cultures. "Cultural relativism" is the solution recognized by
anthropologists. It is a philosophical, methodological, and practical approach to cross-
cultural analysis.56 The cultural relativist recognizes that epistemology derives from the
force of acculturation, and he seeks to apply this knowledge to assist in his analysis. At
least one noted anthropologist has written extensively on this subject, and concluded that:
Cultural relativism.., recognizes the values set up by every society [or group] to
guide its own life and understand their worth to those who live by them, though they
may differ from their own... The relativistic point of view brings into sharp relief the
validity of every set of norms for the people who have them, and the values that they
represent. 57
The author, Melville Herskovits, would deny that striving for a culturally relative
perrpective can, as others have argued,create a truly "objective" point of view. He admits,
however, that in attempting to achieve this condition, one can become aware of the hazards
of ethnocentrism. 5 8 One defense commentator succinctly observes the value of cultural
relativism as:
the view that no culturc is superior and that cultural diversity should be tolerated,
understood and appreciated, rather than ethnocentrically condemned. Cultures
should be judged in their own terms, rather than in terms of the values and norms of
the person who is observing that culture from the outside. 59
56 Herskovits' claim in Cultural Relativism, op. cit., pp. 31-33.
571bid, p. 31.
58David Bindley, in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, (New York: Macmillian and
Free Press, 1968), p. 543, described "cultural relativism" as a "state of detachment" from the observed
culture that would allow the observer to achieve "objective" analysis and perspective.
"
59Colonel James B. Motley, US Army, (Ret.). "U.S. Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy,"
Military Review, (January 1990), p. 4.
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D. SUMMARY
This chapter has demonstrated the influence of a culture-specific perspective on a basic
strategic planning model, and how judgement, colored by ethnocentrism, can directly
impact the outputs of the process. It has also reviewed the recommended anthropological
solution to ineffective cross-cultural analysis: cultural relativity, which, one can argue, is a
justification for studying this subject and the strategic culture of adversaries.
The c6apter has also presented a planning model, and reviewed the cultural influence
on this type of structured approach to strategy. The model used for this purpose was
selected for two reasons: (1) because it could demonstrate the problem-solving nature of
fundamental strategy, and (2) because it is a 'developmental" planning model and is the
most appropriate type for use in the next two chapters.
The first two chapters of this study presented the problems of cultural bias in strategy
formulation. One will note that the problem is reciprocal: ethnocentrism works both ways;
it influences all parties involved. Logically, one would assume that, given an
understanding of this biased condition, one need only select an application (such as
strategy) and conduct further analysis to ascertain specifically the source and influence of
culture on a case-by-case basis. This is exactly the argument put forth by those who
engage in "cultural and stylistic" methods of security analysis.60 They seek to explain
apparent "misjudgment" in defense planning in cultural terms, and have recommended a
new variable for use in the strategic planning equation. The variable is called "strategic
culture" and the effort of this study now turns to this topic.
6 0 Gray's phrase in Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit.
34
IV. STRATEGIC CULTURE
The emphasis of Part I of this thesis has been on acculturation and the fundamental
influence that culture exerts on cognitive capabilities. The reader should be able to see the
linkage between culture and perception, and of the implica:ion that this knowledge holds
"for effective problem-solving and decision-making in strategic planning. This knowledge
itself has important consequences for the strategist because it allows him to see the source
of his own epistemology; it also exposes the fact that his derives from a different source
than that of his opponent. Illuminating this concern has been one objective of this study,
but it also serves as the intellectual foundation of Part II where the concepts of "strategic
culture" and its d -rivative, "nationaj .,le" in strategy, are examined.
This study has reviewed the funiamentals of culture: its source, purpose and
influence on cognition and behavior. An organizational approach has been used that 1ot..zs
at culture as a social-learning tool in support of group development and maintenance.
Strategy was also examined and, in this regard, it was demonstrated to be a process that
groups employ to adapt and survive vis-a-vis the external environment. Finally, the
process of strategy itself was reviewed to expose the significant influence that the group's
culture has on that process itself. These points serve to underpin the next two chapters of
the study and are the basis for the theory that each nation develops a unique "strategic
culture," that is said to influence national security behavior in the international environment.
According to :his theory, strategic culture serves as a value-system that provides the
assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes that members of the group hold about the use of force as
an instrument of policy in international relations. As a result, the strategic culture guides
and circumscribes specific facets of a nation's security behavior. In particular, a nation's
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security policies and military strategies (the "outputs") are believed to be a function of the
strategic culture.6 1 The concept holds that, just as culture conditions individual behavior
in groups and societies, so strategic culture conditions the security behavior of nations
within the international community. Moreover, it produces predictable and recognizable
national "styles" in strategic problem-solving. This chapter examines the concept of
strategic culture and looks at a methodology to analyze the subject.
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE: PURPOSE AND USAGE
Strategic culture is a concept based on the understanding of culture as the intellectual
underpinning of behavior. The assertion that a culture and its value-system affect cognition
and behavior was addressed in detail in Part I of this study. And, although one may accept
the underlying linkage between culture, perception, and "overt behavior," it is not
intuitively obvious that this relationship holds equally firm %.t he individual and national
levels. The linkage between the two is analogous, yes, but it is less direct and therefore
less compelling. Nevertheless, an effort has been made in this area to explain the security
behavior of nations and this seems to be the basic usage of the concept of "strategic
culture."
61Proponents of the "strategic Culture" construct will lx. the first to argue that the concept docs not argue
in favor of mono-causality: the "strategi: culture" may guide attitudes and belief, but, as Schein noted,
"situational contingencies" in the environment may influence specific behavior in a given situation. Schein
Organizational Culture, op. ciL, p. 9; Grayin, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., has
stated that "one is discerning tendencies, not determinants." p. 35; Snyder, in Soviet Strategic Culture,
op. cit., p. 38, cautions: "The notion of strategic culture, strategic doctrine, and crisis style does not posit
a rigid code of behavior. Rather, they suggest that the evaluation of the rationality of alternative course of
action in specific situations will, reflect in part, stylistic and cultural predispositions."
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To proponents, strategic culture represents another variable in strategic studies and, as
such, it appears to have two fundamental applications. 62 First, it appears that the concept
is used by security analysts to describe the influence that culture has on a nation's sec irity
behavior in the international environment. Secondly, it appears to be used as an analytical
tool to understand how the construct impacts national security behavior.
As a descriptive construct, strategic culture is used to illuminate the influence of culture
on a wide variety of activities related to how a nation uses, and thinks about using, its
armed forces. However, because the construct is neither fully developed or widely
accepted (both because of "methodological" inadequacies), it is difficult to outline precisely
when and how to use it. Only a few authors have so far even used the term in their
writings, and they have described cultural influence across the full range of modern defense
topics from nuclear strategy to entire defense programs, policies and behavior. In addition,
there are others who, while not specifically mentioning "strategic culture" per se, have
cited, for example, the U.S. "%%ay of war" as a result of cultural and historical
experiences. 63
620r'e could argue that "culture" as a "variable" for determining the external behavior patterns of nations is
not new. is previously noted, this is, however, a new area in "security" studies. The security behavior of
a nation is recognized as one component of its "foreign policy," and in this regard, "cultural influence" has
been examined previously. For example, in what seems to be one highly regard text on the subject of
foreign policy, James Rosenau aggregates culture in ore of the "five principal variables" for determining
international behavior of nations. Rosenau includes "culture" under "those non-governmental aspects of a
society which influence its external behavior" in his "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," from
The Scientofic Study of Foreign Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 95-149. The "five
variable clusters" are listed on p. 108-109. In a more recent text on the same subject. K. J. Holsti,
acknowledges that "military behavior" is an "output" of foreign policy, and thai it is influenced by attitudes
that cause orientation in national roles. See chapter 4, "Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles."
in International Politics A Framework for Analysis, 5th Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
1988), pp. 92-115.
6 3 Russell F Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Policy and
Strategy, (Bloomington: The Indiana University Press, 1977) is representative of this genre.
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As an analytical tool the concept is even less developed and therein lies the reasoning
behind much of the principal criticism. The studies mentioned above examine historical
events and conclude that culture affects strategic behavior, however, but does so without
support of a testable model; a cause -and- effect relationship between a strategic culture and
specific behavior is argued, but, many would say, not proven.
Therefore, neither application is fully developed in the existing literature; its usage
varies from case to case and author to author. This inconsistency seems to stem from the
fact that although proponents accept that a strategic cultures exists, and that they condition
some aspects of security behavior, their specific contents have yet to be agreed upon. For
example, in two of the most representative pieces of literature on this topic, neither author
develops a theoretical framework of the variable strategic culture in any detail. Both declare
its existence with a general definition as it pertains to their particular study and then proceed
to outline the effects that it has on the specific nations under examination.64 As a result,
critics question the conclusions based upon a "strategic culture" theory. One naysayer
(although not specifically addressing either of the works cited above) launched a broadside
at the entire genre when he concluded that:
This points to the dangers in many efforts to explain foreign policy or military
strategy through focus on "national style," "psychological processes," or "strategic
culture": such explanations tend to debase the political debate. They can easily
degenerate into ad hominen arguments; one does not have to demonstrate that any
particular policy was wrong, only that it stemmed from "irrationai causes,"
"misperceptions," or "cultural biases." 65
This criticism is not entirely invalid because proponents do seem to concentrate on the
artifacts of a strategic culture, but, unfortunately, do not provide sufficient front-end
"
6 4Gray's Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., and Snyder's Soviet Strategic Culture, op. cit.
6 5 Scott Sagan's review of Robert Dalleck's American Style of Foreign Policy. in Survival, op. cit.. p.
192.
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analysis of the concept itself to help support their conclusions. They may, as in the case of
Colin Gray's Nuclear Strategy and National Style, expend great effort describing the
effect of the strategic culture itself, but they do not support this effort with a model of how
this culture came to be or by demonstrating the basic linkages between cultural theory and
strategic application. The literature is dominated by what strategic culture does: how it
effects perception, how it can influence strategy formulation, and how it produces stylized
behavior, but rarely is any detail provided on the intellectual foundations of these
conclusions. This leaves those who employ the concept open to the criticism of using
faulty and unproven methodology which, in turn, calls into question the conclusions
obtained. Ken Booth, a "founding father" in this area of defense analysis (his Strategy
and Ethnocentrism is one of the most frequently cited texts on culture's influence on
strategic thinking), cautions against the "myth" of a "Strategic Man" driven to predictability
by cultural determinants. He is an outspoken critic of those who refuse to admit that
culture affects perception, but he is concerned that the construct of strategic culture takes
the notion too far. "Society," argues Booth, "explains everything, and therefore it explains
nothing." 66  Causality linkage is certainly a contentious issue. Booth's caution is
acknowledged, but the evidence that culture, by definition, influences behavior is too
strong to ignore. The question remains, however, can this knowledge be used predictively
and methodologically to gain insight into the future strategic behavior of nations? This
chapter addresses this issue through an examination of the two principal applications of the
concept as outlined above. The objective is to provide a more fundamental understanding
of the concept itself and to look more closely at a possible methodological approach and
application of the idea.
"6Ken Booth, "American Strategy: The Myth Revised," in Ken Booth and Moorehead Wright, eds.,
American Thinking About Peace and War, (Sussex, UK: The Harvester Press, 1978), Chapter 1, pp. 1-35.
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B. STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENON
The most basic function of strategic culture is descriptive, but what exactly it is to
describe is unclear. Even the strongest proponents of this construct appear divided on this
issue. Colin Gray, for example, believes that strategic culture describes the "modes of
thought and action with respect to force" that a nation and its citizens hold. He argues that
this "derives from perception of the national historical experience" and the "aspiration for
self-characterization." 67 Gray's usage of the concept seems to imply that the strategic
culture is nothing more than a subset of the cultural values of a society, i.e., a subset that
describes the assumptions and values that a nation applies (as a group) to the resolution of
questions about the use of force as an instrument of national policy.
Another proponent, Jack Snyder, describes strategic culture quite differently. In his
path-breaking 1977 RAND study, Snyder implies a much more limited and yet specific
application of the concept as a descriptive phenomenon. 68 He seems to believe that the
concept is most appropriately used in conjunction with a specific group within society,
specifically a nation's military "strategists." 69 The following passage clearly illuminates
Snyder's view of the concept:
6 7Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., p. 36.
68This is Gray's classification of Snyder's study in "National Style of Strategy: The American Example"
in International Security, op. cit., p. 21
6 9Snyder's study discusses methodology based upon the "generic rational man" versus "Soviet man" and
concentrates on the "strategist" He concludes that "it is enlightening to looks at Soviet leaders not just
as generic statesman who happen to be playing for the Red team, but as politicians and bureaucrats who
have developed and been socialized into a strategic culture that is many ways unique and who have exhibited
distinctive stylistic predispositions..." (emphasis added); see Soviet Strategic Culture. op. cit., p. 4.
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It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique "strategic
culture." Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic
thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes
and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-
permance that places them on the level of "culture" rather than mere "policy." Of
course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the
international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively.
Rather they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the "strategic
culture." 70
Neither application described above is in direct conflict with one another. In fact,
Gray admittedly builds on Snyder's initial work and both seem to perceive the concept in a
similar manner.7 1 However, the difference in application between Snyder and Gray is
significant: it is the broad versus the narrow application of the concept that makes
definition so difficult. Proponents seem to believe that strategic culture represents
"attitudes and beliefs" about some aspects of security matters, but they do not seem to agree
on (1) who specifically holds these values or, (2) what they are. To be useful as a tool, the
concept must be defined in more than general terms and it would appear that a useful place
to start might just be to "::ro in on what strategic culture may be used to describe.
1. Strategic Cul.~ure and Military Strategy.
Several authors have used the term in their writings and each indicates that it is
associated with a specific nation and the way that nation handles a particular aspect of its
"security dilemma." Unfortunately, the applicable aspect seems to vary. The concept is
always associated with "the use of force," either real or potential, by a nation to secure
70 Snyder, Soviet Strategic Culture, op. cit., p. v; Snyder recognizes the effect of "situational
contingencies" on specific behavior.
7 1Gray. in both "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, op. cit.,
and Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., says that he bases much of his interest in this subject
and the trajectory of his thinking on Snyder's RAND study and Booth's Ethnocentrism. Additionally. in
Nuclear Strategy, he analyzes both the U.S. and Soviet "styles" (and by extension, tweir "strategic
culture").
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political objectives; this seems to be true even if the objective is solely "defense." In this
regard, one would assume that strategic culture involves the "assumptions" that guide the
use of force and military strategies.7 2
Gray and Snyder have done the most influential work on this subject, but they
have only defined the concept in terms of the particular issues addressed in their studies.7 3
Carnes Lord, another defense analyst who wrote specifically on the subject, also failed to
provide other than a general definition of the concept.74 This shortcoming is heightened
when one considers the broad topic areas that the three authors addressed as the subject of
their inquiry. Gray and Snyder examined some aspects of Super Power nuclear strategy
while Lord critiqued "military strategy" and the U.S."way of war." Gray's efforts are the
most extensive and his Nuclear Strategy and National Style is definitely the most
comprehensive study on the effects of a "strategic culture" to date. For this reason it is
worth looking at closely.75
Gray's extensive study examines the "dominant concepts" of U.S. nuclear
strategy, including deterrence theory, strategic stability, escalation control and crisis
72This assertion is reinforced when one considers the "official" definition of military strate8y: "The art and
science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the
application of force or the threat of force." JCS Pub.]. Department of Defense "Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms," Washington.D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 January 1986). p. 228.
73According to Snyder. strategic culture may be defined as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional
responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired
through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy. In the area of
strategy, habitual behavior is largely cognitive behavior." (emphasis added); Soviet Strategic Culture, op.
cit., p. 8.
74According to Lord, "strategic culture" is "the fundamental assumptions governing the constitution of
military forces and the ends that they are to serve" (emphasis added); see "American Strategic Culture," in
Comparative Strategy, op. cit., p. 271.
75This portion of the study will look at some of what Gray has written on the U.S. "strategic culture" in
order to get toward a basic understanding of his use of the concept. He has written similarly on the Soviet
Union. but this will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.
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management. He contrasts U.S. theories against his understanding of Soviet nuclear
doctrine, and concludes that the U.S. had erroneously contrived a nuclear strategy against a
"fictional" Soviet Union:
I believe that U.S. incomprehension of its own and Soviet strategic culture and
national style has misled U.S. policy-makers and, as a consequence, has led to the
making of poor policy... The United States developed a strategic force posture,
endorsed strategic doctrinal concepts, and pursued arms control agreements vis-a-vis
a substantially fictional Soviet Union .... [T]he Soviet Union, for reasons of its own,
did not (and does not) share the U.S. approach to deterrence; has no vision of
strategic stability that is even remotely congruent with that dominant in the United
States; is dismissive of our (U.S.] traditional, doctrinally authoritative theory of
escalation control and crisis management; and view arms control negotiations as an
instrument for waging political struggle. 76
One can see that Gray applies the concept of strategic culture as a determinant of policy
in general and of national nuclear policy in particular. The "policies" Gray assails are those
generated in the form of "Defense Guidance" (or NSDM, NSDD, PD., etc.) by successive
American Administrations from Presidents Eisenhower through Carter. "Policy guidance"
then became the "objectives" of the "national military strategy" which in rum drove nuclear
force posture, arms control, and alliance relationships for the U.S. 77 Gray contends that
these policies, and their "outputs" in the form of nuclear force posturing, arms control, and
alliance relationships, have been impaired by "little more than the character of [U.S.]
culture."78
76Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., p. ix.
771bid, Chapter 1. "Nuclear Weaplns and World Politics," pp. 1-32.
7 1bid, p. xi.
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In Gray's assessment, certain aspects of U.S. culture are reflected in a number a
what he calls "national beliefs" about the American military experience. 79 These beliefs, he
claims, inform, in turn, the strategic culture that has dominated U.S. nuclear policy and
strategies for the past forty years. Those beliefs, he says, reflect what Americans have
collectively learned about "questions of war or military force" throughout the history of
their country and, as such, have been conditioned by uniquely American "strategic-cultural"
legacies.80 The effect, argues Gray, is that American strategy has been dominated by
attitudes that may be said to form some of the content of the strategic culture.81
According to Gray, the U.S. defense community, drawing upon the cultural and historical
legacy of the U.S., came to adopt "uniquely American" attitudes about national security in
79Gray: "American's have tended to believe": (1) that "good" causes triumph: (2) that the United States
can succeed in anything that it pursues energetically; (3) that Americans cannot fail; (4) that the U.S. can
out-produce any enemy in the material needed for victory. (emphasis added): Ibi, p. xi, 42-43. See also
Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1968), especially Part II, "America's Style", pp. 87-216.
80 He admittedly draws his conclusions from the works of others, especially, John Shy, "The American
Military Experience: History and Learning." Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 1 (1971), pp.
205-228; and Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Policy
and Strategy, op. cit.
8 1Gray implies (although he does not elaborate) that these so-called "legacies" form a good part of the
linkage between the host culture and the "strategic culture" in the U.S. It is here thai he seems to offer
explanation for his lack of front-end analysis on the concept itself: "One coulJ, and perhap's should, dwell
on the strategic-cultural legacy of continental insularity and isolation from truly serioub --carity dangers. on
the conditioning effect of living with weak, non-threatening neighbors on one's frontiers, o- the experience
of taming a frontier of continental dimensions, an the enduring impact of fundamentalist religious beliefs...
and so on. Although Bernard Brodie was correct in his assertion that "good strategy presumes good
anthropology and sociology," the starting point for the professional strategists should be with the subject
that he understands best--siategy-..and not with cultural anthropology." (emphasis added) Nuclear
Strategy and National Style, op. cit., p. 40.
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the nuclear age and these have come to represent what the U.S. strategic culture assumes
about nuclear issues.
8 2
Snyder's theorizing shows a similar trajectory. In Soviet Strategic Culture, he
also concentrates on particular aspects of U.S. nuclear strategy, notably, "escalation
control." His study, commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, sought to determine how the
Soviet Union would view U.S. efforts at intra-war deterrence and use of "limited nuclear
options." His interpretation of the "intellectual history" of U.S nuclear strategy is similar to
Gray's. He concludes that theories on "escalation control," "intra-war deterrence," and
"limited nuclear options" are solely U.S. notions. He says that they are the products of a
"game-theoretical speculation" style of decision-making that dominates in the American
defense community today as it has since the early 1950s. 83 When he contrasts U.S. to
Soviet nuclear theory, he concludes that they are quite dissimilar because of differences in
perspective. He emphasizes, however, that a great deal of the difference in perspective
82The "strategic-cultural" attitudes to which Gray refers pertain specifically to nuclear issues. He says that
the U.S. defense community, in common with the American people, have come to believe (1) nuclear
superiority could not achieved or sustained and was unnecessary to secure national security; (2) that
technology, in the form of increasingly sophisticated and deadly nuclear weaponry, had caused a "stamiegic
deadlock; (3) that the U.S. military was in an unending quest for larger forces that could, in reality, achieve
no meaningful "military benefit": and (4) therefore, a quest for "damage-limitation" was nothing more than
fuel for a senseless "arms race." The beliefs accordingly drove attitudes and these are reflected in the nuclear
policies and strategies of the period 1960-1980. The attitudes are (1) that nuclear war cannot be won; (2)
that other cultures would come to share this "special knowledge" with the U.S.; (3) that U.S. cooperation
with the Soviet Union would have constructive results: (4) that the U.S. "military-industrial complex" was
as dangerous to world peace as the Soviet Union; (5) that the U.S. was, and would always remain,
technologically superior to any foe; (6) that "managing" the "strategic balance" was more important than
realistic "defense planning"; (7) that there was a "rhythm" to defense behavior that would allow Americanc
to respond by mobilization if necessary to respond to a foe. Mbid, pp. 50-56. There is a striking similarity
between this list and one entitled "non-issues" put together by Herman Kahn in "An Overview," to
ThinkLng About the Unthinkable in the 1980s, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 23-53.
83Snyder, Soviet Strategic Culture, op. ciL, p. 5. The influence of "game theory" on U.S. strategic
thinking is also covered in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, (New York: Simon & Schuster,
Inc., 1983), passim, and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1981), especially Chapter 12, Section 5: 'The Formal Strategists," pp. 175-189.
45
(and by implication, the strategic culture) is the result not only of who has does the
theorizing, but also of how. According to Snyder, the American strategist had been
influenced by experience and cultural predisposition into adopting a "game-theoretical
conception" of strategy that leads to belief in "universal truths." 84 The Soviet strategist
has a dissimilar set of "truths." He observes that:
American strategy has been developed in a large part by civilian intellectuals and
systems analysts who are by nature enamored of such concepts. Soviet strategy, by
contrast, has been developed largely by professional military officers, whose natural
inclination, one might suppose, would be more oriented toward military effectiveness
than game-theoretical elegance. 85
As opposed to their U.S. counterparts, Soviet leaders have been conditioned by a
significantly different set of cultural and historical experiences. 86 This has resulted in a
radically different perspective on nuclear strategy and one, he claims, that does not bode
well for successful implementation of U.S. plans for "intra-war deterrence" or successful
"escalation control." The inconsistency, Snyder argues, is the result of differences in
strategic thinking that reflect "separate and distinct strategic cultures in the two
countries."'87
One can see both similarity and discontinuity in the conceptualization and usage of
the concept of strategic culture in the works of Gray and Snyder. The similarity is that they
841bid. p. 6.
8 5 1bid.
86Several "'factors" that conditioned Soviet strategic thinking according to Snyder are: (1) The unique
Soviet strategic position and circumstances that lead to a preponderance of conventional forces; (2) historical
legacies from World War II; (3) Marxist-Leninist modes of analyzing the strategic balance and the world
"correlation of forces"; (4) the Soviet technological and economic base which has been inferior to its
primary competitor; (5) the bureaucratic politics of the Soviet totalitarian and one.party system. Ibid, p. 8.
871bid, p. 22
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both perceive of the notion as a description of the attitudes, beliefs, and modes of thinking
about nuclear issues, hence the "cultural" nature of the phenomenon. They also appear to
concur on the effect that it has had on defense decision-makers in both countries. It seems,
however, that they see dissimilar origins of the "strategic culture." Gray implies that it is a
function of the U.S. culture writ large and is differentiated from the other "cultural
baggage" in the minds of defense analysts only by the focus of specific defense issues.
Snyder does not disagree with this assertion, but he seems to imply that it flows from a
"group" function within the national defense decision-making community. They are
probably both correct and this fact becomes evident when one attempts to examine the
concept as a tool for use in predictive analysis.
C. STRATEGIC CULTURE AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL
The study has shown that the concept of a strategic culture is used to describe the
cultural phenomena that condition the international behavior of nations. Although Snyder,
Gray and Lord's definitions differ in scope and content, they all seem to agree that specific
aspects of a nation's security behavior may be significantly influenced by cultural
predispositions. However, in each case, the definition provided was limited to the topic of
inquiry in the particular study. This would seem to limit application of the concept of
strategic culture when, in fact, its potential would seem far greater. For the concept to be
,iniversally valid, however, especially if it is to be used as an analytical construct, it will
need to be defined specifically and stand alone apart from the artifacts it is said to create.
The definition of the concept of culture provided herein meets this criteria. It only requires
the "strategic" modifier. Culture, by definiton, is (1) a pattern of assumptions that (2) a
group learns as it deals with problems of (3) internal integration and (4) external adaptation.
Therefore, if valid, a "strategic culture" must consist of these elements. If this is correct,
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then one should be able to apply this framework to a specific nation to ascertain the content
of a unique national "strategic culture." Such knowledge could then be exploited for both
predicative and heuristic purposes.
Based on the discussion of culture in chapter II of this study, one should be able to see
how this framework can be applied to a specific nation. However, it is also clear that the
strategic behavior of a nation is not influenced by every member of "the group." The task
of providing for the national security is the responsibility of the government, or rather of
specific sub-groups within the government, the "national command authorities." By this
design, the nation becomes the "group," or host, and the "security community" a "sub-
group" within the host. This sub-group is what Jack Snyder referred to as the "defense
community," and it may be approached as the group that holds the nation's strategic
culture.
1. The Security Community Group
Recognizing the "security community" as a sub-group within a nation assumes
that the host's "primary tasks" and core missions are also those of the sub-group and that
therefore its products are consistent with the goals of the "host group." However, the
security sub-group has been assigned the unique mission of providing plans, programs and
strategies to ensure the host nation's security. Therefore, the "primary mission" of the
security community becomes "strategic" by definition. 88 The group came together as a
function of necessity for the host government and its continued existence as a group is
obviously a function of its success in preventing the host nation's destruction or conquest.
"
8This assumption does not discount the obvious argument that could be made in saying that once
constituted as a separate group the "security community" develops a new "primary task" of its own: to
ensuring its own continuation as a group. This study will not go down this path and explore the
implications for theories of bureaucratic politics that this notion engenders.
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As a defined group 8 9 with a "primary task" and criteria for survival, the security
community group must attend to its maintenance functions, and these are satisfied initially
by (or develop in conjunction with) the "culture" of the host nation and, over-time, by the
new assumptions, rules, and patterns of behavior that the group develops from within.
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Of course, the "external adaptation" issue that dominates group attention is the strategic
mission of the nation.9 1 As such, the cultural predispositions of the group, whether they
are acquired from the host or developed as a group function, will be reflected in the
strategies developed for use in the external (international) environment.
2. Strategic "Assumptions"
The strategic assumptions that are of the most concern to analysts are those
directly related to the group's primary mission. They would be defacto reflections of not
only the "core assumptions" of the host nation, but also the specific strategic assumptions
89
"'his appears to be the most quarrelsome aspect of the propostd methodology. Group definition may not
be as clear or definitive as the methodology requires. In the case of the United States, for example, just
who comprises a hypothetical "security community" is itself quite a problem. The major constituents are
obvious, but the effect on the defense decision-making process that "unofficial" players (such as business
and academia) have must be resolved if the methodology is to be realistically employed. The case of the
Soviet Union has, until quite recei.tly at least, been significantly different. Western analysts have
traditionally believed that security strategy formulation lay mainly in the domain of a weU-defined group:
the Soviet military. However, as Snyder noted in his study (and as events inside the Soviet Union would
tend to confirm), this may well be changing as "non-traditional" elements in the Soviet society begin to
have a say in defense matters; as a result, the Soviet "strategic culture" may be in "transition" as it wrestles
with new integration and adaptation issues. See Snyder, Soviet Strategic Culture, op. cit.. discussion on
"strategic sub-cultures," pp. 10-11.
90As Snyder norted: the "strategic culture" "sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic
debate" with the security community" (emphasis added); Therefore, one could conclude that, by definition
and Snyder's observation, "strategic culture" performs "interna, maintenance" functions for the security
community group. Soviet Strategic Culture, op. CiL, p. 9.
9 1There are obviously "external adaptation functions" related to the daily activity of operating as a "group"
in tie government that will reflect strictly the "organizational" or "bureaucratic" culture of the group, but
this c.sue is not addressed herein. For an interesting account of "bureaucratic politics" within tie U.S.
security community (Department of Defense), see Carl Builder, The Masks of War: American Military
Styles in Strategy and Analysis, A RAND Corporation Research Study, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University press, 1989).
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that the security group has about the various aspects of providing for the nation's security.
As portrayed in Figure 11-1, assumptions drive values and artifacts. Therefore, a specific
"type" of strategy (such as nuclear, conventional, "low-intensity," or even psychological)
as a "artifact" of the culture would reflect these assumptions.92 0ne would posit that this
group of assumptions would include such considerations as:
1. The utility and legitimacy of military force as an instrument of policy.
2. The nature of international relationships.
3. The rational role in the maintenance of international order.
4. The realistic military effectiveness of specific weapons systems and tactics.
5. Civil-military relations. 93
The above listing is by no means complete but is presented as an example of the
types of strategic assumptions that the group is likely to make or have acquired from its
parent society. The assumptions answer some of the basic concerns of how to think about,
perceive, and resolve national defense issues in the contemporary internaticnal
environment. Such assumptions would obviously prescribe the types of security strategies
generated by the group. For instance, if the group preconsciously assumes that war is
immoral under any circumstance and that the use of force to compel human activity no
matter the reason is "morally" (hence culturally) reprehensible, then one could expect (1)
that the group's "value system" and (2) "artifacts" (such as the "security strategy," if any)
9 2Using this methodology, one could argue that Gray, Snyder, and Lord had "levels of analysis" problems.
They were concentrating on "values" (beliefs and attitudes are "testable in the social environment" and hence
considered values) and "artifacts" (a nuclear strategy, like the technology associated with it is an artifacttal
reflection of the culture) ard only skirted the "assumptions.". For example, some of the "beliefs" and
"auitude"Gray outlined are second-order consequences of the "strategic assumptions" outlined above.
93Some elements of this listing were taken from Lord, "American Strategic Culture," Comparative
Strategy, op. cit., p. 272 and Frederick Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and
Strategic Planning," Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, no. 3, (September
1988), pp. 36-39.
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would be non-violent. The example may be extreme, but one cannot deny that the tradition
of warfare i - an instrument of policy is in political (cultural) disfavor in the West--- one
could argue that the West has "learned" that warfare is, under most circumstances, counter-
productive and that it has become an instrument of the last resort. 94 As a result, if one
understood this assumption to be true, it may be concluded that war, in the Clausewitzian
sense, i.e., "as a continuation of policy by other means" has become an inoperable
doctrine, and warfare an unusual contingency. 95 Knowing this, one could hopefully
understand th'e "just war" circumstances and plan for them.96
A nation's basic cultural assumptions about the nature of war in the modern world
are going to prescribe whether or not that nation is a "threat" to other culturally dissimilar
nations in the world. This is, of course, not in all cases going to be the principal
determinant (as the "just war" conundrum implies), but it does nonetheless imply
"tendencies," as Gray would say. Likewise, a nation's assumptions about both the
international environment and its role in it also portend much about how that country
perceives and rationalizes military behavior toward neighbors. No nation yet assumes that
the current international environment is other than anarchistic and with no supra-national
police force or effective United Nations to corral intransigent nations in the "community."
Thcrefore, each nation, by itself and in conjunction with other like-minded allies, provides
94See for example Carl Kayse&.. "Is War Obsolete?" a Review Essay of John Mueller's Retreat From
Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), in International
Security, Vol. 14, No. 4. (Spring 1990), pp. 42-65. Although he disagrees with Mueller's thesis that war
has become "sub-rationally unthinkable" he does concur that "conscious attitudes toward war (which the
author acknowledges are "cultural" attitudes] have indeed changed." p. 62, (emphasis added).
9 5Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard trans. and eds., (Princeton: The
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.
96For an excellent synopsis of "seven doctrines of moral war" which includes the "Principled Pacifist" and
"Just War Defense," see Eric Mack, "The Moral Basis for National Defense," in Robert W. Poole, Jr., eds.,
Defending a Free Society, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 1-31.
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for its own security. However, there are basic and fundamental differences in perception
about who is a "benign" player in the environment. As an example, sonic nations believe
(based upon cultural assumptions) that there are religious "infidels" in the world that
deserve eradication. Radical "Muslim fundamentalists" seem to act as though this were so
and they have gained governmental power in at least one state (Iran); others may follow.
At the same time, orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine assumes the inevitability of conflict
between social systems and that therefore the international environment is, by definition,
hostile as long as opposing social systems exist.
Finally, to use a Soviet phrase, the "military-technical" assumptions about specific
weapons systems also drive security behavior. This is especially true in the nuclear age
and has been brought into sharp relief in the debates about weaponry in the West. The
answer to the question of whether war is acceptable or not and under what circumstances it
is guides strategic thought. However, the strategic community ultimately "learns," and
comes to make assumptions about, the utility (or "morality") of specific weapons systems.
This is particularly true of weapons of mass destruction. As an example, one can now
recognize convergence on assumptions that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have concerning
nuclear weaponry and warfare, i.e. "utility only in non-use.'"97 However, one should also
recognize the potential for misunderstanding of the source of this apparent convergence.
Whereas nuclear weapons havc :g been seen as "in'.moral" and "counter-productive" by
some American standards,98 they were never "immoral" in an amoral communist nation
9 7Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., p. 50.
"
98 ee, for example, Robert E. Osgood, The Nuclear Dilemma in U.S. Strategic Thought, (Boulder,CO:
Westview Press, 1988); and Michael Vlahos, Strategic Defense and the American Ethos, (BoulderCO:
Westview Press. 1986). Both of these authors discuss in detail the effects of a influential group of
American strategic thinkers who believe in the "immorality" of nuclear weapons. Osgood calls this "sub-
group" the "abolitionists." p. 7.: Vlahos calls this group the "purifiers."
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and are only recently being recognized as counter-productive.99 In both Soviet cases, the
apparently new assumption evolved for different reasons than it had in the U.S.100
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the principal usage of the concept of strategic culture. It has
been shown that proponents of this type of defense analysis use this concept as (1) a term
to describe the culture (in assumptions and beliefs) that a nation's security community
holds and, (2) as a tool to see how this may be used to understand the behavior of that
particular group. Finally, Schein's definition of the levels and contents of culture was
applied specifically to the case of a theoretical "security community" sub-group believed to
exist in a nation. Examples of the strategic assumptions were presented to demonstrate
how this model of culture applies in this case. Hopefully one will accept the admittedly
incomplete listing of the fundamental assumptions said to constitute a, portion the strategic
culture . It is merely presented as an example of the types of strategic-cultural assumptions
that describe the specific content of the concept. However, the disclaimer at the beginning
of this chapter holds firm: the field is still immature. It is in what Gray calls a
"rudimentary, or pre-theory, stage today." 10' This chapter looked closely at the theory
and has described one methodological approach to the subject. There are recognizable
difficulties in applying the framework: group definition and "strategic assumption" both
99Stalin rejected the "revolution in military affairs" that nuclear weapons were said to have created. This
resulted in an assumption that nuclear weapons were nothing more than a new. more destructive type of
"artillery." This belief has changed but it is not because they now recognize the inherent "immorality" of
the weapon.
100t would seem that orthodox Marxist determinism which rejected the "revolution in military affairs"
ushered in by nuclear weapons has been forced to accept that nuclear weapons presented a "survival threat"
to communism and therefore had to be dealt with in spite of the ideological dilemma it presented.
10 1Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., p. xii.
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present the analyst with definitional difficulties, but the concept itself seems to have
validity. However, it would appear that the methodology, if applied at the proper level of
analysis, can be made to work. One need only separate assumptions, from beliefs and
artifacts, and apply the results to a behavioral model. The next chapter makes an attempt at
this by building upon the strategic culture model presented in this chapter.
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V. NATIONAL STYLE IN STRATEGY
Different nations behave differently. This observation is so well known that it is rarely
scrutinized. Yet, explanations for this phenomenon are legion. This study has looked at a
relatively unexplored explanation, and proposes that a nation's strategic culture is one
factor that conditions national behavior. One should not misread this assertion as advocacy
of mono-causality because, clearly, many other factors are at work as well. However, one
cannot ignore the influence of culture on behavior, and the belief that this notion holds true
at the national level cannot be discounted because of incomplete or under-developed theory.
The evidence presented thus far would tend to support those who argue in favor of
"cultural and stylistic analysis." One of the most compelling justifications for this type of
foreign and defense policy analysis lies in the fact that nations do behave differently, and
they seem to do so in a manner that is both consistent and recognizable over time. This
phenomenon is described as a "national style." It has been dealt with extensively by
students of U.S. foreign policy, but only recently has it been applied specifically to national
security behavior. 102
The idea of a national style is the logical consequence of the belief that a nation's
culture affects its behavior. "Style" implies, by definition, repetitive and predictable
behavior; this study has shown that behavior is conditioned and predisposed to certain
types of behavior by cultural determinants. The study has also examined one exilanation
for national behavior through the concept of strategic culture. However, there are certainly
10 2For example, in addition to Robert Dalleck's American Style of Foreign Policy, op. cit., see Elting
E. Morison, eds., The American Style, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958) and Stanley Hoffman,
"America's Style," in Gulliver's Troubles, op. cit.
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other reasons for specific behavior, but they do not preclude recognition of culture's
influence. 103 Nevertheless, national style cannot be fully appreciated without an
understanding of how cultural determinants produce repetitive behavior. As reviewed in
the previous chapter, the methodology which permits one to see the cause-and-effect
linkage in these concepts is still incomplete. However, the results are at least recognizable.
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND NATIONAL STYLE
The previous chapter examined the concept of strategic culture in some detail, but the
reader may not be convinced that this concept helps explain or predict international
behavior. This chapter addresses that concern. One methodological approach to strategic
culture was demonstrated in the previous chapter. The proposed approach seeks to locate
the basic strategic assumptions that guide behavior. These assumptions are said to
underpin thought and action by the "security community" on specific issues of national
defense. The relationship between assumptions and behavior is said to create a national
style for resolving security issues that is "a truth by definition." 1 04 When considered as
such, a nation's style may be recognized as an artifact of its strategic culture. It is, by
definition, an "overt behavior pattern" and it may be causally linked to the cultural
assumptions that the group holds about the specific activity in question.
10 3 0ne could easily argue, for example, that a nation is restricted in its ability to act on the international
stage by its capabilities (or lack thereof), by the anarchistic "structure" of the international system, or
because of its own political system. However. each of these conditions the way the "group" thinks about
the cxternal environment and over time it learns to behave xcording to its capabilities and within its
limitations.
104Gray says that a "national style is not the random product of imaginative thinking by policy-makers;
instead it is a pattern of national response to challenge which has worked adequately in the past. This is
really a truth by definition because a strategic culture and national style that failed to meet objective tests of
adequacy imposed by external security politics would lead inexorably to the political, if not physical,
demise of the nation." (Emphasis added); from "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters, Journal of
the U.S. Army War College, Vol. XIV, No. 4, (Winter 1984), p. 29.
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This study has demonstrated the linkage between culture and behavior, and it has
examined a hypothetical construct that offers the potential to show the existence of a similar
linkage between culture and national behavior. This portion of the study looks at a
conceptual model to more clearly illustrate this relationship. The concept of strategic
culture was examined in the previous chapter, and its principal usage as a descriptive
phenomenon and analytical tool reviewed. The chapter concluded that the idea appears
valid although the methodology used to accurately describe and give texture to the concept
is incomplete. The limitations of theory are acknowledged, however, strategic culture is
used herein to describe a set of assumptions. Those assumptions underpin the military
strategy a nation contrives to satisfy a primary external adaptation issue: defense in the
international environment. Furthermore, these assumptions are said to reside in the minds
of individuals who make up a nation's security community while representing the culture of
both the host society and the distinct security group. Existence of a "security group" as a
distinct sub-group within a host nation is a key assumption. It appears valid even though it
is difficult to cornceptually bound such a group. The study proceeds on the assumption that
the concept is valid.
The previous chapter also presented examples of the assumptions that the security
community has or has made about elements of its "strategic" mission. One will recall that
assumptions form the most basic component of a culture, and that they condition and
influence a group's value system and overt behavior. This relationship is believed to exist
in the case of the strategic culture and security community as well. For example, military
strategy is, by cultural accounting, an "overt behavior" that reflects the culture of the
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security community and the parent nation. 10 5 However, this study does not assert that all
individual or collective behavior is solely a f, nction of cultural predispositions. As
Herskovitz has noted: "culture is not a straight-jacket, it is bt a loose garment." 106 Its
impact on behavior is significant because it forecloses options, but other elements in the
environment also have influence on behavior under certain circumstances. 107
Culture is said to produce a unique style of behavior. In the case of nations, the style
is said to reflect consistency in the way nations behave in the international environment.
This notion has been applied to a number of specific behavior patterns related directly to a
nation's foreign and defense policies. The concept of strategic culture, however, is
specifically associated with the strategic behavior of nations. Its influence is seen in how
nations operationalize their defense policies. This chapters examines this notion by
providing a model of strategic behavior and applying this to a case study of the contrasts
between U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategic behavior.
1. Modelling National Behavior
Much of the criticism levelled at those who offer culture as a cause of national
behavior is based on the fact that it is difficult to demonstrate direct linkage between cultural
assumptions and specific behavior. The concept of strategic culture is beset by the same
criticism. This section describes how specific types of strategic behavior may be linked to
the notion of a strategic culture by adapting a model that has been proposed in the field of
105At least one defense commentator has argued that the U.S. is unable to create a coherent, long-term
strategy because of uniquely American cultural impediments. See Steven Metz, "Why Aren't Americans
Better at Strategy?" in Military Review, Vol. LXIX, No. 5, (May 1989), pp. 9-15.
106 Herskovitz. Cultural Relativism, op. cit., p. 87.
107This observation was made by Stanley Hoffman in Gulliver's Troubles. op. cit. He states that
"America's style" of foreign policy "restricts the area of choice by closing off ccrtain options, which are not
perceived or the exploitation of which there are no mental and behavioral tools, and also by dictating certain
ideas and attitudes whose adequacy is open to doubt." p. 93. (emphasis added).
58
foreign policy studies. The proposed model was developed specifically to account for the
influence of "cultural and societal" variables in the international behavior of nations. 108 In
this manner alone the model is unique, but it also makes an important contribution in how
"behavior" is defined. This distinction makes the particular model useful in this study.
The creator of this model, Baard Knudsen, concluded that much of the difficulty
associating cultural influence to specific behavior is due to how one defines behavior. If,
for example, behavior is defined only in terms of observable events, then the linkage is
blurred by what Schein called the "situational contingencies." 10 9 The result is that
causality appears due more to the environment itself than to cultural determinants.
1 10
However, Knudsen noted that, by re-working the "output" variable of policy, culture's
subtle but discernible influence can, in fact, be observed. Knudsen's recommended
solution is a "complex dependent variable" that he describes as both "pluralistic" and
"hierarchical." He defines foreign policy behavior as consisting of (1) orientations, (2)
sectorial policies/plans of action and, (3) specific behavior. Figure V- I illustrates this
relationship.
108This model is proposed and preliminarily developed by Baard Knudsen in "Mhe Paramount Importance
of Cultural Sources," Cooperation and Conflict, op. cit.. particularly pp. 104-106.
109Schein, Organizational Culture, op. cit., p 9.
1 10For example, see Graham Allison's "Cuban Missile Crisis" study re-printeJ in Reinhart & Strum. eds..
American Defense Policy, op. cit. Ailsion determined that there were "rational," "bureaucratic," and
"organizational" causes in American behavior during the crisis.
I I! From Knudsen, "The Paramount Value of Cultural Sources," Cooperation and Conflict, op. cit., p.
106.
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Foreign Policy Behavior Model
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NOTE: Thickness of arrow signifies relative strength of causal relationship
Figure V- I
The Knudsen Model demonstrates that the "output" of a nation's foreign policy
activity is not confined to observed, event-related behavior. He sees the three causal
components of his equation as affecting not only events, but also as creating the intellectual
and programmatic precursors of specific behavior. 112 Knudsen recognizes that before an
nation can act in a specific circumstance, it has developed an orientation (or style) that
drives both specific action and forethought sectorial policies, and plans about how it
perceives it will act. This model describes one way of conceptualizing culture's influence
at the national level of behavior. Knudsen acknowledges, however, that the model is
112Knudsen describes "orientation" [which he takes from K.J. Holst's International Politics, op. ciL]
as (1) attitude toward participation in international relations in general. and (2) statements about national
interests and foreign policy goals. "Sectorial policies" and "programs of action" are "declared attitudes or
policy with regard to separate issue-areas, nations, and specific goals." (emphasis added); p. 105.
Additionally, borrowing from CaUahan let. al., Describing Foreign Policy Behavior. (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 1982), p. 299], Knudsen describes "policy" as "a standard used in the making of
decisions." Ibid, p. 104.
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experimental, and that its application requires further development and more elaborate
definition of the content of specific causal variables. The following section adapts the
model for use herein and proposes refined variables to demonstrate strategic culture's
influence on national behavior.
a. Strategic Behavior Model
With slight modifications, Knudsen's model may be adapted for use as a
strategic or defense policy behavior model. By substituting "strategic culture" for
"cultural/societal forces" and "national style" for "orientation," the hypothetical relationship
proposed by this study can be seen. This adaptation seems consistent with both the
implications of the strategic culture variable and with some of the more traditional methods
offered for studying the defense policies of nations. The elements presented in one
authoritative text on comparative defense policies are used to adapt Knudsen's model. 13
These elements, aggregated under the titles of "national attributes" and
"environmental/situational conditions," combine the commonly used causal elements that
113Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). This section draws primarily from the outline of
the authors methodology of comparative defense policy studies, chapter 1, entitled: "Defense Policy in
Comparative Perspective: An Introduction," particularly pp. 5.6.
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effect components of a nation's defense policies. 114 Figure V-2 illustrates the
modifications to Knudsen's variables. 115
Strategic Behavior Model
National Style
SNt ategic Culture f
Figure V-2
Sectorial DeensfenseS~ Plans & Programs
Environmental/ Security o ilu
"Situational Conditions wolEnldesc lm e a Behavior
CAUSAL FACTORS COMPLEX DEPENDENT VARIABLE
NOTE: Thickness of arrow signifins relative strength ofcausal rel caionsh a o
Figure V-2
114Murray & Viotti categorize these elements in a slightly different manner ("Capabilities for
Accomplishing National Security Objectives." "Domestic Determinants," "Defense Decision-Making
Process," "International Environment") but for illustrative purposes, "National Attributes" would include
most of the -structural" determinants of defense policy behavior. Examples are (1) the political system; (2)
the economic system; (3) geographical location; (4) population; (5) level of development: etc.
"Environmental/Situational Con~ditions" would include such elements as (1) the nature of the international
system itself; (2) the nation's relative position in the system, (3) threats; ('4) alliances; etc. Ibid, p. 6-7.
11 5This model is not meant to infer that there is no relationship between the causal factors. As
demonstrated in Part I of this study, there is significant interaction between the environment and the
strategic culture, and the strategic culture and the group's "national" structure; however, this relationship is
intentionally not illustrated in this model.
62
Strategic culture is but one causal variablt, however, it has the most
significant influence on the constitution of a nation's strategic style. 116 The national style
of strategy is then reflected in the other output variables, including (1) sectorial defense
policies and programs, and (2) specific event-related behavior. This model demonstrates
the linkage between s'rategic culture and specific types of strategic behavior. 1 17 The
study uses this model in the case of U.S. and Soviet national styles in nuclear strategy in
the following section.
B. NATIONAL STYLE IN STRATEGY: A CASE STUDY
This portion of the study ties the major themes of this thesis together by using the
adapted Knudsen Model of national behavior. In order to accomplish this goal, a selected
portion of the defense policies of the United States and the Soviet Union is examined to
effort illustrate how separate and distinct strategic cultures can affect the way different
nations perceive and plan for national defense. The case study at hand is not meant to be
exhaustive; it is only meant to illustrate how the concepts and ideas presented herein may
be applied systematically to the defense analysis and strategic planning process. Granted,
the methodology used in this study requires additional refinement and possibly application
116 Categorization of a nation's strategic "national style" is not as simple as with Holsti's "orientations."
In the Knudsen Model, "orientations" are describes as "globalism," "isolationism," "neutralism," or
"coalition." (See Hoisti, International Polidcs, op. cit., pp. 94-101). However, ctrategic style appears to
vary signif -antly and it makes generalizations difficult. One could argue that strategic style is closely tied
to Hoisti's orientations" because "global" strategies are obviously different than "neutral" ones. However,
in the case of two globally oriented nations (such as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.). the style of strategy may
still differ.
I 17Examples of "sectorial policies and programs" may include: (1) national objectives; (2) national
security objectives; (3) national military strategies, etc. Examples of "security behavior" [Murray &
Viotti's "Recurring Issues: Defense Policy Outputs") are (1) weapons acquisi,;ons; (2) force posture; (3)
arms control events; (4) use of force incidents. See Murray & Viotu, Defense Policies of Nations, op.
cit., p. 6.
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in other areas of strategy before it can be applied "operationally." But, the models used
nevertheless appear valid and this is demonstrated by the following case study. 11 8
The contrasting nuclear strategies of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are used to illustrate
the proposed effect of a national strategic culture and style of strategy. This topical area
was selected for several reasons. First, the nuclear strategies employed by the two
countries are different, so much so that scholars have seized upon strategic culture and
national style in strategy as key explanations for why this is so. Secondly, this topic is
examined because no other area of super power defense policy has received equivalent
attention either by the strategist or the national command authority in either country.
Finally, nuclear strategy was selected because the efforts of other analysts have provided
the type and quantity of data necessary to test the model. 119
The case study begins with a brief review of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies. This
is followed by an examination of some of the strategic assumptions that are believed to
guide members of the strategic communities in the two countries. These assumptions are
then linked to strategic beliefs and the artifacts that they are said to create. Finally, using
the linkages demonstrated by the strategic behavior model, the study shows how each
1 I 8For example, it would seem appropriate to further test the hypothetical models presented herein using
other types of defense strategy, such as conventional, low-intensity conflict, etc. There is evidence to
suggest that the models will also explain other types of strategic behavior. For example, see Carnes Lord
discussion of U.S. conventional strategy in "American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, op. cit.,
and Colonel James B. Motely's discussion of low.ititensity conflict in "US Unconventional Conflict Policy
and Strategy," Miliwtry Review, op. cit. Both authors cite U.S. strategic culture as affecting strategic
behavior in areas other than nuclear strategy.
I 19 Most of the data used in this section is taken from the Gray and Snyder studies, but the works of a
number of other respected scholars augment and amplify the data from principal sources. The additional
sources include Ken Booth, Rebecca Strode, John Erickson, Benjamin Lambeth, Fritz Ermath, Richard
Pipes, Robert Bathurst, Steven Kime, Nathan Leites, and Lawrence Ficedman. Specific sources are .;ited as
appropriate.
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nation's style in strategy, as an artifact of its strategic culture, shapes specific nuclear
policies and the event-related behavior associated with those policies.
1. Asymmetrical Strategies
The differences in U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy have been dealt with
extensively in the literature. 120 This section highlights those differences, but the reader
must appreciate that this case study is not to show how the strategy differs, but why. For
this reason, the review is brief and encapsulated. The reasoits offered by defense analysts
for differences in nuclear strategy are varied, and cover a wide range of explanatory
causes. 121 However, Gray, Snyder and others have said that one of the most important
reasons is that separate and distinct strategic cultures guide U.S. and Soviet nuclear
strategy. Cultural and stylistic analysts believe that strategic culture provides the intellectual
and cognitive underpinning of strategic theory and, as a result, prescribes specific strategic
behavior. According to this theory, the nuclear strategies of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. must
be influenced by cultural determinants.
120Colin Gray observed: "in the late 1970s, American defense commentators discovered what they had
known all along---that the Soviet Union did not appear to share many of the beliefs and practices beneficial
to the American idea of international order. This should not have come as any surprize, but it did.
Although Western strategic literature is replete with warning against the practice of mirror-imaging and
projecting American desires and perspectives uncritically upon Moscow, those warning went unheeded until
the late 1970s." from "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters, op. cit., p. 26. For a useful
comparison of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy, see the "country studies" of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., written
by Lawrence W. Korb and Edward L. Warner Ill, respectively, in Murray and Vioui, eds., The Defense
Policies of Nations, op. cit. In the "Concluding Perspective" to this text, the editors state that "there is
little, if any, doctrinal consensus (on nuclear strategy] between the United States and the Soviet Union." p.
484.
12 1For instance, Rebecca Strode, in an article on Soviet strategy, concludes that although there appears to
be a "style" of strategy (which she defines a "patterns of behavior in the creation and utilization of military
power which recur with sufficient frequency to support the hypothcsis that they are endemic.... p. 320), it is
due to "geography, historical experience, and economic and technical constraints." See "Soviet Strategic
Style," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 3, No. 4, (1982), p. 320.
65
If one accepts that strategy drives event-related strategic behavior in a manner
presented by the model introduced in the previous section, then one can conclude that U.S.
and Soviet nuclear strategies are different. 122 This judgement is based on apparent
differences in weapons systems and arms control behavior. 123 It is true that both
countries possess similar offensive systems, and superficially, this fact alone would lead
one to conclude that the two have similar nuclear strategies. However, upon close
examination, significant differences in strategic systems become evident. 124 Probably the
most recognizable difference is that the U.S.has not invested in active or passive strategic
defense systems; quite the opposite is true for the Soviet Union. Additionally, the two
countries have long pursued apparently divergent arms control agendas. These differences
are caused by a number of factors, but it appears that they also result from asymmetrical
strategic assumptions, the most influential one of which pertains to the effect that nuclear
weapons are believed to have had on the nature of war in the modern world.
a. Strategic Assumptions and Beliefs
The Soviet Union and the United States have both dealt with the strategic
implications of nuclear weapons in the hands of potential adversaries. Each has had to
address the fact that there are several nuclear powers and both have therefore had to
122For a contrasting opinion on what drives strategic bchavior, see Robert W. Komer, "The Neglect of
Strategy," in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 67. no. 3 (March 1984), pp. 51-59. Komer concludes that "our
military posture is shaped by budgets, politics, technical imperatives, and inter-service scrambling" but not
by "serious strategy-making." p. 5 1.
123See for example, a study conduced by Arthur 2. Alexander, "Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons
Procurement." Adelphi Papers, Number 147 & 148, (London: The InterniiUonal Institute for Strategic
Studies, Winter 1978/79). Alexander claims that 40-50% of Soviet weapons procurement decisions are
based on "history, culture, and values." p. 43.
124For a synoptic review of the differences in hardware and capabilities, see "A Garthoff-Pipes Debate on
Soviet Strategic Doctrine." Strategic Review, Vol. 10, (Fall 1982), pp. 36.63. Also reprinted in excerpt
form in P. Edward Haley and Jack Merriu, eds., Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future,
(Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 176-185.
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consider the possibility of multiple nuclear adversaries. This section concentrates on U.S.
and Soviet nuclear theorizing because only these two are the significant nuclear
competitors, and their respective strategic programs are aimed principally at each other.
What is interesting to note is that even though each has had to wrestle with a
similar security problem, Americans and Soviets have apparently arrived at different
conclusions about how to resolve the "nuclear dilemma." On the U.S. side, it is generally
accepted that nuclear strategy is based upon the deterrent value of a threat of "assured
destruction." This notion holds that a stable (and hence "safe") strategic balance is one in
which neither side can rationally consider the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union,
however, appears to hold a different and more "self-serving" strategic philosophy based
upon "useful [military] advantage." 125 These divergent perceptions have resulted in
recognizably different strategic behavior that is especially evident in strategic defense-
related behavior. It is not disputed that there are a number of reasons for this development.
However, the possibility exists that, the core reason is traceable to different strategic
assumptions and beliefs. 126
It appears that there are identifiable differences in the assumptions made about
(1) the nature and legitimacy of war in the modem world and, (2) the effect that nuclear
weapons have had on the use of force in the contemporary international environment. For
example, there is ample evidence to suggest that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have
125John Erickson has described this as a SANE (as opposed to "MAD") stategic paradigm (Survival And
National Existence). See "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology, and Style," in John
Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds., Soviet Military Power and Performance, (Hamden, CN: Archon
Books, 1979), p. 28.
126With regard to strategic defense systems and strategic nuclear philosophy, this is the essence of the
argument presented by Michael Vlahos in Strategic Defense and the American Ethos, op. cit.Additionally, see Bernard D. Claxton. "Traditional American Military Doctrine and SDI," in Defense
Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1988). pp. 347-359. Claxton concludes that "large-scale [strategic] defense
systems are not compatible with the American way of war." p. 357.
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fundamentally different assumptions about what constitutes a "just war," and, as a
corollary, about how to resolve disputes in the international community. These
assumptions may ultimately be absorbed in distinct styles of nuclear strategy. The U.S.,
for example, has traditionally eschewed warfare as a legitimate means of settling
international disputes' 27 . Americans are hesitant to become involved in warfare and
would rather set an example as a nation that solves problems through diplomacy vice
force.128 Consider the following observation by one American defense commentator:
In the American view, then, war is waged not to seek adjustment of the balance of
power, or for any more precise aims, but rather with the purpose of altering or
reforming those political circumstances, however they may be defined, which caused
the war. War itself is evil. Its prevention, similarly, is the overriding goal of policy.
(emphasis added) 129
The Soviet doctrine, like the U.S., also distinguishes between the "just and
unjust" wars, but their differentiation is not based on a belief that "war is evil." Rather, to
the Soviet strategist, "wars waged by socialist countries against imperialists are, by their
127The same belief may be held in other "mature" Western democracies, especially the United Kingdom.
For cxample, see Michael Howard's study of Western liberalism and modern war in War and the Liberal
Conscious, (Oxford,UK: Oxford University Press, 1978). See also Edward Hallett Can- discussion of the
conflict between the "realist" and "liberal" in Western thinking about war in the inter-war years in The
Twenty Years Crisis: 1919.1939. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). The same conflict can be recognized
today. Finally, See Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic
Problems of Our Times, (Oxford. UK: Oxford University Press, 1983).
1 2 8Richard Pipes has asserted that Americans hold the "pervasive conviction" that "human conflicts are at
the bottom caused by misunderstanding and ought to be resolved by negotiation rather than force..." From
"Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," re-printed in Murray & Viotfi, eds.,
The Defense Policies of Nations, op. cit., p. 134. Additionally, Russell Weigley makes a strong case for
the "traditional" American aversion to war which, he says, explains the cyclical style of American defense
preparedness and involvement in wars. See The American Way of War, op. cit.
12 9William R. Emerson, "American Concepts of Peace and War." Lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War
College on 17 December 1957. Reprinted in Naval War College Review, Vol. 10, no. 9 (May 1958). p.
5.
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very nature, just."'1 30 The Soviet Union does not view warfare as an aberration, but rather
as a natural consequence of history, economic competition, and class conflict.13 1 Soviet
strategists believe that war is an inevitable reality for which they must always prepare, and
prepare to win. 132  Nevertheless, the Soviet Union does not want war, and war
"deterrence" may be a common paradigm held in common by the strategic communities in
both Super Powers. 133 However, the way to accomplish deterrence is a function of how
the problem is perceived. Apparently, the U.S. strategic community holds the assumption
that warfare is generally illegitimate.134 Therefore, it perceives the issue of settling
international dispute as a "bargaining process" in which all parties should realize some
130Uri Ra'anan, "Contrasting Views of the Role of Strategic (Politico-Military) Doctrine: Soviet and
Western Approaches," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Uri Ra'anan, eds.. National Security Policy, (Hamden,
CN: The Shoe String Press, 1984). p. 113.
13 1See Steve F. Kime, "The Soviet View of War," in Comparative Strategy. Vol. 2. No. 3, (1980), pp.
205-221.
1 32This is an assumption thal devolves from both historical and ideological causes. The Soviet Union, as
the heir to Imperial Russia, has a historical appreciation of the recurring possibility of war with neighbors.
However, a significant reinforcement to the historical "lessons learned" is engender by Marxist/Leninist
ideology: The Soviet Military Encyclopedia, for example, states that the Soviet Union will regard a
future war as a "decisive confrontation between opposing social systems." Social systems that, according
to their ideology, are inevitably in conflict. These points are covered well by Robert Bathurst, in "The Two
Languages of War," in DerL k lebaert, eds., Soviet Miliary Thinking, (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1985), pp. 28-49.
13 3Steve Kime has assened that the "Soviets do not want war." However. he cautions that nevertheless.
they are prepared to fight one in a manner and style that are "more salient than the judgement that the
Soviets do not want war." See "The Soviet View of War," in Comparative Strategy, op. cit., p. 218.
Additionally, Murray & Viotui believe that "deterrence" is the only concept that U.S. and Soviet stategists
hold in common, but they note that there is no clear consensus from other analysts on this point. See
"Concluding Perspective," in The Defense Policies of Nations, op. cit., p. 484.
1 34 This assertion does not discount the existence of dissent within the ranks in the U.S. strategic
community. As Colin Gray has observed, there are "sub-cultures" within the strategic culture that hold a
more Clausewitzian view of war. However, evidence indicates that the dominant viewpoint is that war is
illegitimate.
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relative benefit. 135 The Soviet Union's approach to deterring aggression is much more
unilateral. Robert Bathurst, for example, has concluded that, in effect, there are "two
languages of war" spoken by members of the security communities in the U.S. and Soviet
Union. He observes that:
What emerges from comparing the two languages of war is that one culture, which
thinks of war as external to its normal pursuits, cannot understand another in which
war is, and has been for centuries, central to its existence. 136
In addition to having fundamentally different assumptions about the nature
and legitimacy of war in the modern world, it appears that the two strategic communities
hold diverging opinions about the effect that nuclear weapons have had on warfare. Again,
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the dominant assumptions held by those in the
security communities of those countries are different. One could argue that the "nuclear
adaptation issue" has been resolved quite differently by each group. U.S. nuclear strategy
reflects a basic belief that nuclear weapons have altered the very nature of war or that
nuclear weapons can lead to political gain.137 It follows that there can be no victor in a
nuclear war. Therefore, the weapons have logical utility only to deter a potential adversary
135This is Colin Gray's observation in Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op. cit., Chapter 2.
Richard Pipe's also makes this judgement in "Diplomacy and Culture: Negotiating Styles." in Richard F.
Staar, Eds., Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality, (StanfordCA: The Hoover Institution Press, 1984),
pp. 154-162.
136Robert Bathurst, "Two Languages of War," in Derek Leebaert, eds., Soviet Military Thinking, op.
cit., p. 38.
137This "assumption" can be traced to an assertion made by Bernard Brodie in what appears to be one a
the most influential pieces of literature on the subject. He wrote: "Thus, the first and most vital step any
American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in
case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind. The writer in making this statement is not concerned
for the moment with who will win the next war in which atomic bombs are uscd. Thus far the chief
purpose of our military establishment has been to win wanr. From now on its chief purpose must be to
avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose." From The Absolute Weapon, (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 76.
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from "irrationally" employing them138. Fritz Ermath succinctly sums up the effect that
these assumptions have on artifactual U.S. strategy:
The essence of U.S. [nuclear] doctrine is to deter central nuclear war at the lowest
feasible levels of arms effort and strategic risk by presenting the credible threat of
catastrophic damage to the enemy should deterrence fail. 139
It appears that U.S. strategists are more concerned with how a war will start,
rather than what will happen should one begin. Conversely, the Soviet strategist appears
more concerned with how a potential war will end.140 This dissimilarity results because
the Soviet strategist does not hold to the American assumption about the "disutility" in
nuclear weapons. According to those who have interpreted Soviet military writings on the
subject, the Soviet strategic community only recognizes that nuclear weapons are more
destructive, but not to the point of disutility. Whereas the U.S. strategic belief is that there
can be no victor in a nuclear war, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Soviet belief is
the antithesis. John Erickson has observed that the Soviet strategist still believes in a
"decisive battlefield victory." He argues that "the principle remains the maximum
application of military force" in spite of the existence of nuclear weaponry.14 1
13 8 This assertion may appear in conflict with the U.S. declaratory policy of "extended deterrence" to its
Western Allies, but there is a great deal of dispute over whether or not this policy was ever more than just
that --.- a declaratory policy. See. for example, the discussion of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe
by Lawrence Freedman entitled "A Conventional Defense for Europe," Chapter 19, in The Evolution of
Nuclear Strategy, op. cit., pp. 285-302. especially p. 290.
1 39 Friz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," in Derek Leebaen, eds.,
Soviet Military Thinking, op. cit., p. 51.
14 0 This observation is made by Steve Kime, in "The Soviet Way of War," Comparative Strategy, op.
cit., p. 213.
14 1John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine. Technology, and Style," in John Erickson and
E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds., Soviet Military Power and Performance, op. cit., p. 34. Richard Pipes makes
a similar argument in "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," in Murray &
Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations, op. cit., "victory is possible," pp. 148-149. Benjamin S.
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The divergent strategic assumptions held by the security communities in the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. drive different styles in strategy. Each has a particular way of
resolving their unique national perceptions of the nuclear dilemma. As a result, the
strategies that have evolved are quite different. This would not be so potentially dangerous
were it not for the fact that the U.S. strategy is, for the most part, based on an assumption
of mutual vulnerability, whereas the Soviet strategy has long been dominated by an
emphasis on war-fighting capability. The results are seen in asymmetrical strategic
behavior that is evident in weapons systems acquisitions and arms control events.
b. Strategic Artifacts: National Styles in Strategy
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have different strategic styles. The reason for this
includes a combination of causal variables, but this study maintains that cultural factors are
central. The discordant U.S. and Soviet estimates of the military value of nuclear weapons
is probably only one of a of number of cultural asymmetries that have led to the
distinctively Soviet and American styles of nuclear strategy-making. Those different values
are linked to behavior, which, if repetitive, becomes stylistic. Colin Gray has written
extensively on the unique styles of U.S. and Soviet behavior, and the assumptions outlined
above are consistent with the beliefs that he enumerated in support of his conclusions. 142
Gray contends that the U.S. strategic style is essentially managerial and cooperative and
Lambeth concurs: "victory is possible" according to Soviet beliefs. See "How to Think About Soviet
Military Doctrine," also in Murray & Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations, p. 148.
14 2See FN 79.
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based on a belief that all parties share a similar perspective of the "game.'" 143 Conversely,
the Soviet style is much more "zero-sum" and views the East-West conflict that must have
winners and losers, not mutual advantage. Soviet strategic statecraft is also much more
heavily dependent upon the use of force, both domestically and internationally, than is the
U.S. style. These inconsistencies in style are, in turn, reflected in event-related strategic
behavior. The following section demonstrates the linkages.
c. Strategic Artifacts: Event-Related Behavior
The sectorial strategies that the two countries pursue are briefly outlined
above: deterrence through mutual vulnerability versus war-fighting. These strategies have
produced event-related behavior in weapons acquisitions and in arms control that reflect
both the assumptions, beliefs and style of the two countries. As noted above, the most
visible difference in U.S. and Soviet strategic behavior with regard to weapons systems is
in the area of st-tegic defenses. One could argue that the presence or absence of these
systems is causally linked to the strategic cultures of the two nations. In the case of the
United States there is evidence to suggest that the lack of ballistic missile and civil defense
stems directly from assumptions made about the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons as outlined
herein. If one follows the logic as presented, then one may see that strategic defense is
inconsistent with the assumptions hMid by the American strategic culture.144 The strategic
143Gray's conclusion of a U.S. "management" style of strategy derives from cultural assumptions that are
both strategic and political in nature. This style is said to devolve from the strategic assumptions that were
developed as the U.S. strategic community worked through the adaptation issues involved in folding nuclear
weaponry into traditional strategic philosophies. The "game-theory" rationalists to which both Gray and
Snyder refer saw the strategy of deterrence, the problems of escalation control, and the arms race as strategic
dilemmas best suited to "rational management." There is evidence to suggest that, by the time Secretary of
Defense McNainara left office in 1968, many of the "solutions" to these issues were becoming internalized
and had begun to reside in the U.S. strategic culture as assumptions.
144This is the essence of the case made by Bernard Claxton in 'Traditional American Military Doctrine and
SDK," in Defense Analysis, op. cit.
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theories that have sprung from the U.S. security community cannot accommodate the
implications of defense against ballistic missiles.145 By contrast, the Soviet view cannot
accomr-nodate a strategy without them. Whereas the U.S. strategist believes that they are
unnecessary at best, and detrimental to the "strategic balance" of mutual vulnerability in the
worst case, the Soviet strategist apparently believes exactly the opposite.146 A strong case
can be made that these two diverging beliefs were central to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty that limited such systems. To many in the U.S., this treaty signalled that the
Soviet Union understood and accepted U.S. strategic beliefs, but the evidence is highly
inferential at best. A strong case exists that both parties signed the treaty for their own
reasons and that those did not coincide.14 7  The fact that parties to negotiations have
divergent goals when signing agreements is not in itself unusual or necessarily detrimental.
14 5
"The keystone of security in a world populated by powers possessing vast nuclear and conventional
weapons, 3 condition of mutual assured destruction...a condition that must not be jeopardized by the
development of ABM systems. Such defensive measures, which seek to develop a significant damage-
limitation capacity, and which therefore threaten to undermine the other side's assured destruction capability,
only threaten to unbalance the strategic equilibrium and thrust the arms race into a new realm." From
Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972,
(Lexington,KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 163. Although Yanarella is speaking to the
views of what he terms the "finite containment" school of nuclear strategy, this excerpt succinctly captu;es
the essence of the dominant arguments against BMD and SDI in the U.S. strategic community today.
14 6 Steve Kime notes that "there is a strong emphasis in Soviet thinking on the strategic defensive. This
is an outgrowth of the notions that victory and survival must not be viewed as hopeless, even in the nuclear
age....It is no exaggeration to say that Soviet strategic force posture is based upon a "quadrad" instead of the
"triad" notion that influences U.S. thinking. Strategic defensive measures are viewed by the Soviet
citizenry as just as important as the three offensive "legs." This is deeply imbedded in the Soviet mindset."
From "The Soviet View of War," Comparative Strategy, op. cit., p. 213.
14 7John Newhouse, argues that the Soviet Union "learned" the "correct" strategic philosophy from the
U.S. and this fact was indicated by their acceptance of the ABM Treaty. See Cold Dawn: The Story of
SALT, (New York: Holt, Reinhart, Inc., 1973). However, Willian Van Cleave (among others) counters:
"Undoubtedly, the SALT I ABM Treaty has been a "success," if its purpose was to administer the coup de
grace to Safeguard and erase the U.S. advantage in ABM research, development, testing, and engineering.
Certainly, many experts regard the agreement that way... What the ABM Treaty really did was to encourage
Soviet development of a counter-force threat to U.S. land-based deterrent forces." See "The Arms Control
Record," in Staar, eds., Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality, op. cit., p. 2-3.
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However, in the ABM Treaty case it was and remains so today because the U.S. misjudged
Soviet intentions to seek unilateral vice mutual benefit. The Soviet negotiators were able to
accomplish this because the strategic culture of the United States is fundamentally different
than its counterpart in the Soviet Union and members of the U.S. security community
failed to recognize this fact. This in itself is a significant "lesson learned" in cultural and
stylistic analysis.149
C. SUMMARY
This chapter introduced a conceptual model to more clearly demonstrate the proposed
linkage between the concept of strategic culture and the outputs of a nation's strategic
planning effort. The model demonstrated that one way of describing these outputs is in
terms of a "complex dependent variable" that consists not only of observable, event-related
behavior, but also of the cognitive planning efforts that must come before action. This
model takes explicit account of the effect of cultural sources on behavior. Although its
application to the ABM Treaty has been limited and selective in the application of data, it is
nevertheless believed to demonstrate the logical linkage between the individual concepts
outlined in this study.
14 8According to Van Cleave, "Arms control, when combined with related strategic concepts, helped blind
Americans to Soviet motivations and objectives. It also led many to disparage the fundamental political
and ideological differences between the United States and the USSR." The strategy led the US ':, "(1) reject
nuclear superiority; (2) offer parity to the Soviet, in the belief that parity would satisfy them; (3) attribute a
role to arms control beyond that originally envisaged. (4) bias strategic programs away from counter.force
and damage-limitation and toward assured destruction; and (5) impute U.S. views and goals to the Sovict
Union, which resulted in a thorough misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives and a chronic
underestimation of Soviet strategic programs." Ibid, p. 7.
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VI. IN THE MIND'S EYE
This thesis has sought to address the very complex topic of the influence of cultural
sources on defense analysis and strategic planning. It is clear that the field is still
developing, and that there is a great deal of work left to be concluded if and before the ideas
examined can become operational. The concluding discussion summarizes the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations.
A. FINDINGS
The study has had two aims. The first was to investigate the influence of culture on
perspective and the significance of this linkage for the defense analyst and planner. Next,
the study investigated the value of cultural analysis for national security behavior. Toward
this purpose, the concepts and methodologies used to describe strategic culture and national
style in strategy were examined. During the course of the investigation, several significant
findings surfaced. They are summarized below.
1. Culture and Perception
Chapter II illuminated the fact that culture does have a significant influence on
how one perceives and judges events in the environment. The process of acculturation was
examined and demonstrated to be a social learning tool that group members employ to
sustain their unique social environment. The study employed an "organizational approach,"
introduced Chapter II. This methodology holds culture as unique to a well-defined and
socially stable group. The chapter borrowed this approach to look closely at how and why
cultures form, maintain, change, and the purposes it serves for the group. Culture was
shown to be a distinct phenomenon unique to the group to it is associated with. Both
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positive and negative effects were examined. It was shown that culture performs vital
functions for the group; it binds, defines, and allows the group to survive in the social and
physical environment. However, it was concurrently shown that, because culture frames
the way people think and act, it can have adverse impact in cross-cultural or inter-group
situations.
2. Culture and Strategy
Chapter III looked at the process of strategy which was shown to be a problem-
solving and decision-making technique employed by the group to achieve desired goals in
the environment. Additionally, a group's "strategy" was presented as an artifact, or
creation. of that group's culture. The chapter also demonstrated that, as a process, strategy
is fundamentally subjective. Therefore, strategic planning was shown to be highly
susceptible to the influence of cultural bias and the effects of ethnocentrism. The chapter
also reviewed several "strategic planning" models and demonstrated how a culturafly biased
perspective influences each step in the analysis and planning process. The idea of cultural
relativism was presented as the solution to this problem. Cultural relativism was briefly
reviewed and presented as an intellectual perspective that allows one to consider the
implications of differences in cultural values between groups. In this manner, it is offered
as one way to partially escape the negative influence of one's own culturally biased
perspective.
3. Strategic Culture and National Style in Strategy
The study applied the findings in Part I to the concepts of strategic culture and
national style in strategy. In Chapter IV, the concept of strategic culture was examined to
ascertain usage and definition. It was shown that the although it receives some use in the
field of national security affairs, the concept remains controversial because of
methodological and definitional inadequacies. The principal works completed in this genre
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were examined and it was discovered that the concept is usually defined depending upon
the particular portion of a nation's defense policy under investigation. In other words, no
broad definition or methodological approach to the concept was located. This causes
confusion when one attempts define the discrete components of a nation-specific strategic
culture. Therefore, the organizational approach to culture was employed to see if this
method could be used to link cultural data with national behavior. The study also adopted a
general definition of culture as a group function and added the "strategic" modifier. In this
manner, the concept was presented as the "culture" that supports a distinct "security-
community" sub-group within a nation. This sub-group is assumed to have a "mission" of
providing the defense strategies for the host nation and, the culture that serves this group
was shown to ".tfect its products. The hypothetical "strategic culture" was then
disaggregated into its component parts and presented as "strategic" assumptions, beliefs,
artifacts, or overt behavior patterns. This way of approaching the concept was briefly
tested to show the linkages between "strategic" assumptions and artifacts. The
organizational approach to the topic of strategic culture appears to work, however, it is
based on an assumption that one can define or conceptually bind the "security commnunity"
sub-group within a nation. This in itself appears to be a very difficult proposition, but one
that could be resolved.
Chapter V built upon the notion of a distinct strategic culture and looked at how
such a construct could be linked to specific strategic behavior. It was noted that much of
the criticism of this type of analysis is due to the fact that linkage is difficult to demonstrate.
The chapter adapted a recent model of foreign policy behavior for use as a "strategic"
behavior model. This model has a complex ceendent variable that offers sensitivity to
cultural soirces. The outcor-e variable of this model is described as three identifiable
"artifacts" e' outputs of a nation's defense policy behavior: (1) a "national style" or a
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recognizable way of dealing with defense issues, (2) "sectorial defense plans and policies,"
that enumerate specific goals, objectives, and strategies, and (3) explicit "event-related
behavior" such as weapons systems acquisition, arms control, or use-of-force events. The
chapter demonstrated the model using a limited case study of U.S. and Soviet nuclear
strategy. The case study selected hypothetical strategic assumptions believed to be held by
the security community in each nation. The hypothetical assumptions concerned the use of
force in the contemporary international environment and the effect that nuclear weapons
have had on war in the modem world. Using data obtained from various defense analysts,
these assumptions were cast against U.S. and Soviet strategic behavior. The chapter
demonstrated how specific specific assumptions can be linked to both a national style in
strategy and specific, event-related behavior.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has demonstrated that culture influences behavior and that this information
has important consequences for the defense analyst and strategic planner. In this regard, it
can assist in strategic decision-maldng by allowing the planner to see the cognitive product
of his own acculturation. The planner must understand and cuntrol the character of his
own epistemology, because any product that he contr; ; for use by society must be
fundame.-itally coherent with the dominant values of the society he serves. Secondly,
cultural and s'ylistic analysis can also expose the fundamental cultural assumptions that
guide a competitois behavior. If the planner's task is to devise a strategy to succeed against
a specific opponent, then the importance of an understanding of how that opponent thinks,
and of what he values, cannot be underestimated.
This study showed that much of the strategy generated by the strategic community in
the U.S. was based upon a misunderstanding of the Soviet strategic culture. It has not had
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catastrophic results because "the delicate balance of terror" has held firm regardless.
However, much of the data and opinions of analysts used in this study pre-date the radical
events occurring in the Soviet Union today. This can cast doubt on the conclusion that the
model works because the current Soviet Union appears so different from the one painted
herein. If, however, the concepts of strategic culture and national style hold true, then the
events taking place in the Soviet Union must be consistent with the cultural values that
dominate in that country. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the security sub-group in the Soviet
Union may well be flux as it wrestles with pressing "adaptation" issues as it seeks to
survive in the new environment. U.S. policy-makers must use caution as the events in the
U.S.S.R. unfold and not succumb to the temptation of hasty interpretation. One must not
neglect the fact that culture colors interpretation of events, and what is occurring in the
Soviet Union can only be fully and correctly interpreted from a perspective that comes with
an appreciation of that vantage point.
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